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Lawyers representing plaintiffs in cases such as those involving
institutional reform' have in the past commonly prosecuted federal
claims in federal court and appended state claims in reliance upon
the federal courts' pendent jurisdiction. These litigants perceived
that federal substantive law was more helpful to them than state sub-
stantive law and that federal judges were more likely to vindicate the
federal rights asserted. 2 Federal courts were also rightly viewed as
willing to provide more encompassing relief for an individual's fed-
eral rights-and even his state rights-than the state courts. 3
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I The conclusions reached in this article apply generally to the justiciability of federal
claims in state court. Institutional reform litigation, because it often raises the problems ad-
dressed here, is used as an example for discussion purposes. "Institutional reform litigation"
means, inter alia, suits brought to improve or modify conditions at prisons, mental hospitals,
and schools, and to protect the rights of inmates or other affected individuals, especially the
mentally ill and mentally retarded. See, e.g., Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litiga-
tion, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281 (1976); Eisenberg & Yeazell, The Ordinag and the Extraordinay in
Institutional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1980); Fletcher, The Discretionar'y Constitution:
Institutional Remedies andJudicialLegiimay, 91 YALE L.J. 635 (1982); Special Project, The Reme-
dial Process in Institutional Reform Litigation, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 784 (1978); Note, Complex
Enforcement: Unconstitutional Prison Conditions, 94 HARV. L. REV. 626 (1981); Note, The Wyatt
Case: Implementation ofa Judicial Decree Ordering Institutional Change, 84 YALE LJ. 1338 (1975);
Developments in the Law--Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1227-50 (1977).
The kind of systemic relief sought in these cases may require the court to assume ongoing
jurisdiction and to supervise the operation of government institutions. See text accompany-
ing notes 155-56 infra.
2 See, e.g., Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1105, 1115-16, 1123 (1977);
Rudenstine, Institutional Injunctions, 4 CARDOZO L. REv. 611, 611-12 (1983); Sager, Fair Meas-
ure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1243 (1978).
3 In New York, for example, federal courts have overseen the reform of jail conditions
for pre-trial detainees. See, e.g., Benjamin v. Malcolm, 495 F. Supp. 1357 (S.D.N.Y.), 88
F.R.D. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), 90 F.R.D. 386 (S.D.N.Y.), 528 F. Supp. 925 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), 564
F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Rhem v. McGrath, 326 F. Supp. 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), argued
sub nom. Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y.), 377 F. Supp. 995 (S.D.N.Y.), a 'd
and remanded, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974), on remand, 389 F. Supp. 964 (S.D.N.Y.), 396 F. Supp.
1195 (S.D.N.Y.), a fbdper curiam, 527 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1975), a fd, 432 F. Supp. 769
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (defendants' motion denied). Federal courts in New York have also overseen
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These assumptions must now be reconsidered. State substantive
law is playing an increasingly important role in protecting the rights
of individuals, particularly in institutions, often granting protection
beyond that of the federal Constitution or federal statutes. 4 In addi-
tion, in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman,5 the United
States Supreme Court recently held that the eleventh amendment
bars the federal courts from granting relief based on pendent state
law claims against state officials. 6 The effect of the Pennhurst decision
the reform of conditions for the mentally retarded. See, e.g., New York State Ass'n for Re-
tarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 706 F.2d 956, 958 n.1 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 277
(1983); Society for Good Will to Retarded Children, Inc. v. Cuomo, 572 F. Supp. 1300
(E.D.N.Y. 1983) (institutional relief under both federal and state law). New York state
courts, however, have been reluctant to entertain suits seeking institutional reform, see note
141 infia, although the New York Court of Appeals has held judicial relief for institutionalized
individuals to be proper. See Klostermann v. Cuomo, 61 N.Y.2d 525, 463 N.E.2d 588, 475
N.Y.S.2d 247 (1984); Sinhogar v. Parry, 53 N.Y.2d 424, 425 N.E.2d 826, 442 N.Y.S.2d 438
(1981); Kesselbrenner v. Anonymous, 33 N.Y.2d 161, 305 N.E.2d 903, 350 N.Y.S.2d 889
(1973); Ellery C. v. Redlich, 32 N.Y.2d 588, 300 N.E.2d 424, 347 N.Y.S.2d 51 (1973). These
New York cases hold only that institutionalized individuals may seek individual relief; the
Court of Appeals in Klostermann did not decide whether class relief would be justiciable. Some
lower courts have recently provided broad relief to vindicate the rights of the homeless. See
McCain v. Koch, No. 41023-83 (N.Y. County Sup. Ct. June 22, 1984); In re Goodwin,
N.Y.L.J., at 12, col. 5 (N.Y. County Sup. Ct. June 6, 1983); Eldredge v. Koch, 118 Misc. 2d
163, 459 N.Y.S.2d 960 (N.Y. County Sup. Ct. 1983) (appeal pending); Callahan v. Carey,
N.Y.LJ., at 10, col. 4 (N.Y. County Sup. Ct. Dec. 11, 1979) (order granting preliminary
injunction). Courts in some other states have been more willing to grant broad institutional
relief. See, e.g., Bustop, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 439 U.S. 1380 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice
1978) (denying stay of busing as part of school desegregation order by California court under
California law); E.H. v. Matin, 284 S.E.2d 232 (W. Va. 1981) (treatment ordered for state
mental patients).
4 See, e.g., Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982); Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protec-
tion of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489 (1977); Howard, State Courts and Constitutional
Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REv. 873 (1976).
5 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984).
6 In Pennhurst, an inmate at Pennhurst, a state institution for the mentally retarded,
brought a class action challenging the conditions at that institution. The action was based on
federal constitutional, federal statutory, and state statutory law. The district court found
conditions at Pennhurst to be both dangerous and inadequate to habilitate the residents-
facts not disputed on appeal. The district court held that these conditions violated plaintiffs'
federal constitutional and statutory rights and state statutory rights. The court appointed a
special master to oversee the institution and to monitor the placement of the residents of
Pennhurst in suitable community living arrangements. Halderman v. Pennhurst State
School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (D.NJ. 1977).
The Third Circuit affirmed most of the district court's order, relying on federal statutory
law (the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6010
(1982)). 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc). The Supreme Court reversed. 451 U.S. 1
(1981). On remand, the Third Circuit affirmed the relief granted based on the pendent state
statutory claims. 673 F.2d 647 (3d Cir. 1982) (en banc). The Supreme Court again reversed
the Third Circuit, holding that the eleventh amendment prevented the federal courts from
assuming jurisdiction over the state claims. 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984). Pennhurst does not apply
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is that these state claims must now be pressed, if at all, in state court. 7
Consequently, litigants seeking relief against state officials must
either forego their state claims and bring suit on their federal claims
in federal court,8 or bring both state and federal claims in one state
court action. Thus, the number of cases against state officials
brought in state court is likely to increase.
State courts, however, may be reluctant to assume the burden of
these cases, many of which involve the reform of state institutions
under either federal or state law. These institutional reform cases
often involve the rights of thousands of individuals9 -rights that
must almost always be asserted against state and local government
officials. Fact-finding can be time-consuming, and appropriate relief
will often be complicated: a court, for example, may find it necessary
to assume on-going jurisdiction and to supervise the operation of an
institution in order to ensure effective relief. Effective relief will gen-
erally require government defendants to spend significant sums of
money to improve services and facilities. Although in recent years
federal courts have relied upon their general equitable powers to
grant this kind of broad institutional relief,10 state courts are gener-
ally not accustomed to do so, and they may now refuse to intervene
only to pendent state claims. Presumably, suits brought against the state under diversity
jurisdiction would also be barred.
7 There would be no federal jurisdiction unless the state legislature waived eleventh
amendment immunity for pendent state claims in federal court, which is highly unlikely.
Even before Pennhurst, institutional litigants with substantial state law claims had reasons to
bring suit in state court. A federal court faced with novel issues of state law was likely to
abstain from determining those issues. See, e.g., Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S.
496 (1941). On the other hand, although the state court might have initially defined the state
right, a federal court, prior to the recent Pennhurst decision, may have taken the lead role in
enforcing that state right. The Third Circuit, for example, in its second Pennhurst decision,
673 F.2d 647 (3d Cir. 1982), reo'd, 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984), enforced the state law rights of all
individuals in a state institution based on a Pennsylvania state court decision, In re Schmidt,
494 Pa. 86, 429 A.2d 631 (1981), concerning the rights of a single mentally retarded individ-
ual under state law. See also Society for Good Will to Retarded Children, Inc. v. Cuomo, 572
F. Supp. 1300 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
8 If they do not prevail in federal court, these plaintiffs can sue in state court, assuming
they are not barred by the state statute of limitations. They can also commence two suits
simultaneously.
9 See, e.g., Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
10 See, e.g., id. Commentators have questioned the propriety of having the federal courts
order and oversee institutional reform. See, e.g., Frug, TheJudicial Power of the Parse, 126 U. PA.
L. REv. 715 (1978); Mishkin, Federal Courts as State Reformers, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 949
(1978); Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REV.
661 (1978). The obligation of the federal courts to oversee institutional reform, however,
arises from the expansion of individual rights in recent decades. See Eisenberg & Yeazell,
supra note 1, at 467. When rights are systematically infringed, relief must be broad in order to
provide an adequate remedy.
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or to enforce broad relief, holding that claims requesting such relief
are not justiciableII in state court.12
Prospective plaintiffs may thus face a paradox: state standards
apparently protect individual rights more broadly than federal stan-
dards, but state courts may nonetheless hold that state justiciability
doctrines prevent state court enforcement of these state standards,
particularly against the executive or legislative branches of state gov-
ernment. In addition, Pennhurst will encourage litigants to present
their federal claims in state court, and state courts may find the fed-
eral claims not to be justiciable under state justiciability standards.
Even if the state courts hold the federal claims to be justiciable, the
state courts may be reluctant to grant effective remedies for the fed-
11 By lack of justiciability, the authors refer to the "political question" doctrine. The
concept ofjusticiability is elusive. Standing, mootness, ripeness, the prohibition against advi-
sory opinons, and "political questions" are all justiciability concerns. See, e.g., L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 56 (1978). This article examines the justiciability concern
often inaptly called the "political question" doctrine. See, e.g., Henkin, Is There a "Political
Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976). Courts, although they occasionally employ the
term "political question," see, e.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 495 (1969), often
appear to refer to this doctrine in terms ofjusticiability. See, e.g., id. at 516; Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 208 (1962); Jones v. Beame, 45 N.Y.2d 402, 380 N.E.2d 277, 408 N.Y.S.2d 449
(1978). Under traditional interpretations, courts may not resolve non-justiciable "political
questions," no matter when or by whom brought.
12 See, e.g., Klostermann v. Carey, No. 82-11270 (N.Y. County Sup. Ct., Oct. 14, 1982),
af'don opinion below, 91 A.D.2d 593, 458 N.Y.S.2d 190 (1st Dep't), rev'd sub nom. Klostermann
v. Cuomo, 61 N.Y.2d 525, 463 N.E.2d 588, 475 N.Y.S.2d 247 (1984); Joanne S. v. Carey, No.
82-18493 (N.Y. County Sup. Ct., Feb. 1, 1983), affdon opinion in Klostermann, 94 A.D.2d 691,
462 N.Y.S.2d 808 (1st Dep't), rev'd sub nom. Klostermann v. Cuomo, 61 N.Y.2d 525, 463
N.E.2d 588, 475 N.Y.S.2d 247 (1984). In both Klostermann and Joanne S, plaintiffs sought to
establish and enforce the obligation of New York state officials to provide appropriate resi-
dences to mentally disturbed individuals upon or after their release from state mental institu-
tions. (In Klostermann the plaintiffs were former mental patients who were homeless; inJoanne
S, the plaintiffs were institutionalized mental patients awaiting release.) Plaintiffs relied pri-
marily on provisions of the New York Mental Hygiene Law and other state law provisions,
federal constitutional due process, and federal statutes.
The New York Supreme Court in Klostermann dismissed plaintiffs' claims on the ground
of lack of justiciability. The court believed that it was bound by the decision in Bowen v.
State Bd. of Social Welfare, decidedjoint@ with Jones v. Beame, 45 N.Y.2d 402, 380 N.E.2d 277,
408 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1978), which suggested that the requested relief would interfere unduly
with the operations of the other branches of government. The court held that it was not
competent to grant that relief. It dismissed the federal law claims on the same state jus-
ticiability grounds on which it dismissed the state claims. The claims in Joanne S were dis-
missed based on the Klostermann opinion.
The Court of Appeals, however, reversed in both cases, holding that Bowen contemplated
that the New York courts could grant declaratory and mandamus relief to individual plain-
tiffs who asserted that the executive branch had failed to deliver services mandated by the
legislative branch. The Court of Appeals left open the question whether a request for class
relief would be justiciable.
The authors acted as counsel for plaintiffs in Klostermann.
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eral claims if those remedies are outside the scope of the state courts'
usual remedies. These problems are by no means hypothetical. Re-
cent state cases demonstrate that they are of immediate concern.' 3
If state courts refuse to define or enforce state substantive law
protecting the rights of individuals, those state rights will remain en-
tirely unprotected. Plaintiffs who turn instead to the federal courts
to force state officials to comply with federal constitutional stan-
dards' 4 may find that federal standards provide only minimal protec-
tion for their rights.' 5 The effect of Pennhurst in the federal courts
could be to encourage the federal courts to fill the vacuum by ex-
panding federal substantive rights. These courts might, for example,
expand federal substantive due process rights and, in particular, rec-
ognize new causes of action, such as state-based federal substantive
due process claims.' 6 It will be difficult, however, for federal courts
13 'eeKlostermann v. Carey, No. 82-11270 (N.Y. County Sup. Ct. Oct. 14, 1982), af don
opinion below, 91 A.D.2d 593, 458 N.Y.S.2d 190 (lst Dep't), reo'd sub noma. Klostermann v.
Cuomo, 61 N.Y.2d 525, 463 N.E.2d 588,475 N.Y.S.2d 247 (1984); Joanne S. v. Carey, No. 82-
18493 (N.Y. County Sup. Ct. Feb. 1, 1983), affd on opinion in Klostemnann, 94 A.D.2d 691, 462
N.Y.S.2d 808 (lst Dep't), rev'd sub nom. Klostermann v. Cuomo, 61 N.Y.2d 525, 463 N.E.2d
588, 475 N.Y.S.2d 247 (1984); In re S.L., (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 24, 1982), aJ'd in
part, reo'd in part, 94 N.J. 128, 462 A.2d 1252 (1983).
14 Dicta in Pennhurst suggests that the Exparte Young doctrine, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), hold-
ing that a federal suit against a state officer was not one against the state, extends only to
federal constitutional claims. 104 S. Ct. at 911; see also id at 933 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In
the absence of congressional abrogation of the eleventh amendment immunity pursuant to
§ 5 of the fourteenth amendment or a state waiver, see note 25 infia, it is unclear whether a
federal court can now compel state officials to comply with federal statutory duties.
The Court in Pennhurst was aware that its decision would have the peculiar effect of
compelling federal courts to decide otherwise avoidable constitutional questions. 104 S. Ct. at
919-20. The Court cautioned, however, that principles of comity and federalism limited the
scope of federal relief. Id. at 910 n.13.
15 For example, Pennsylvania law as interpreted by the Third Circuit in Pennhurst af-
forded the institutionalized mentally retarded a right to the least restrictive treatment, 673
F.2d 647 (3d Cir. 1982) (en banc), reo'd, 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984), a right apparently not provided
by the federal Constitution. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (requiring only
that professional discretion in fact be exercised to determine appropriate treatment).
16 Such claims have not been recognized by the Supreme Court. Cases involving state-
based procedural due process appear to support claims of state-based substantive due process.
State-created liberty or property interests cannot be denied arbitrarily. See Wolff v. McDon-
nell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974) ("The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual
against arbitrary action of government. . . " (citing Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114,
123 (1889) (substantive due process)). In procedural due process cases, the arbitrariness con-
sists of failing to use procedures adequate to support the accuracy of the determination to
deny the liberty or property interest. Thus a state cannot deny an individual welfare benefits
on the ground that he has too high an income without affording the welfare recipient a hear-
ing. Arbitrariness, however, may be unrelated to a defect in procedure. For example, a state
agency might deny welfare payments for a month to all recipients, regardless of their estab-
lished entitlement to payments, even though state substantive law did not permit such a
refusal to make payments. This refusal to pay welfare benefits would be an arbitrary denial
[Vol. 59:1145]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
to enforce any state-based federal substantive due process claims if
state courts refuse, on grounds of non-justiciability, to adjudicate
these state-based claims, because the federal courts will be unable to
rely upon state court definitions of the underlying property or liberty
interests.' 7 Indeed, state court refusal to adjudicate might entirely
eviscerate federal substantive due process claims based upon state
law. 18
In the future, moreover, federal courts may not afford extensive
protection even for the federal rights of individuals as against state
and local officials. Principles of comity1 9 or a continued expansion of
eleventh amendment prohibitions20 may limit a federal court's abil-
ity to oversee state institutions. There is also the continual threat
that Congress will restrict the inferior federal courts' jurisdiction,
both on substantive and remedial matters, and perhaps the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction as well.2 ' It is therefore critical that
of a property interest and would appear to state a substantive due process claim. The remedy
would be payment of welfare benefits, not the procedural remedy of affording appropriate
hearings to each aggrieved individual. In Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982), the
respondent, confined in a state institution for the mentally retarded, sought damages for vio-
lation of his state substantive rights. The respondent argued "that because he was committed
for care and treatment under state law he ha[d] a state substantive right to rehabilitation,
which is entitled to substantive, not procedural, protection under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 316 n.19. The Supreme Court did not reach this issue.
Since it had not been raised below, there was no guidance from the lower federal courts, and
state law was uncertain. In his concurrence, Justice Blackmun elaborated on this theory,
suggesting that if a mentally retarded person was committed for "care and treatment" as
defined by state law, due process "might well bind the State to ensure that the conditions of
his commitment bear some reasonable relation to each of those goals." Id. at 326 (Blackmun,
J., concurring). Chief Justice Burger found this argument frivolous. Id. at 330 n.* (Burger,
CJ., concurring).
17 See id. at 316 n.19.
18 A state court's refusal to adjudicate based on lack of justiciability under state law
could be interpreted to mean that there is no underlying property or liberty interest. Alterna-
tively, refusal to adjudicate could be based solely upon a state court's concerns regarding the
role of the state judicial branch. Thus, the refusal to adjudicate may not reflect upon the
existence vel non of an underlying state property or liberty interest. Indeed, a state court may
assume that such an interest exists under state law, but refuse to enforce the state right. See,
e.g., note 12 supra. A state court refusal to hear the state claims thus would not necessarily
mean that federal substantive due process claims could not be premised on unenforceable
state liberty and property interests. Of course, the refusal of a state court to enforce rights
arising under state law raises procedural due process concerns. See note 22 infra.
19 See, e.g., Pennhurst, 104 S. Ct. 900, 910 n.13 (1984) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362
(1976)).
20 See, e.g., Pennhurst and note 6 supra.
21 More than two dozen bills are pending in House and Senate Judiciary subcommittees
to divest federal courts of jurisdiction in cases concerning issues such as busing, school prayer,
and abortion. See, e.g., H.R. 158, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), H.R. 521, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983), H.R. 798, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), and S. 139, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (school
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state courts vindicate both the state and federal rights of
individuals.22
This article takes the position that the supremacy clause of the
United States Constitution requires state courts to vindicate federal
rights, even when similar rights under state law are held to be non-
justiciable. If this analysis is correct, state courts may not r.ject suits
based on federal law by applying state justiciability standards.
Rather, federal standards of justiciability must control. Likewise,
based on this reasoning, state courts must grant effective remedies for
federal claims and may not refuse to enforce federal remedies solely
on the ground that the state court, as a matter of policy, would not
employ a similar remedy.
Apart from theoretical objections, it may appear to serve little
purpose to force a reluctant state court to address the federal rights of
institutionalized individuals when, at least at present, federal courts
are available to hear these claims. As a practical matter, however, a
constitutional compulsion to hear justiciable federal claims will indi-
rectly help to assure that state courts define relevant state substantive
busing); H.R. 183, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983), and H.R. 525, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983)
(school prayer); H.R. 523, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983), S. 26, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), and
S. 210, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (abortion). The extent to which Congress can constitu-
tionally withdraw jurisdiction from the federal courts or limit the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court has been the subject of a great deal of scholarly debate. Compare Wechsler, The Courts
and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1005-06 (1965) (concluding that Congress has
unlimited power to curtail federal court jurisdiction) with T. Taylor, Statement on Behalf of
the American Civil Liberties Union Before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and
the Administration of Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representa-
tives on Legislative Proposals to Limit the Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and other Fed-
eral Courts (June 3, 1981) (arguing that Congress cannot, consistently with the Constitution,
limit federal jurisdiction to vindicate constitutional rights). See genera/(y P. BATOR, P.
MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 360-65 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER].
22 As a practical matter, plaintiffs who encounter the defense that the rights asserted are
not justiciable in state court will undoubtedly attempt to show that their state claims are
justiciable under state law and that their federal claims are justiciable under both state and
federal law. But state courts have no clearly identifiable obligation under the federal Consti-
tution to hear state claims, and accordingly there is no federal bar preventing a state court
from holding that state claims are not justiciable under state law. The state court may thus
hold state claims not to be justiciable and then hold that state grounds of non-justiciability
bar the state courts from hearing plaintiffs' related federal claims.
The due process clause requires that state courts or other state tribunals be available to
redress claims that state defendants have infringed property (and presumably liberty) rights
grounded in state law. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982); Parratt v.
Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981). It would appear that, wholly apart from state court obligations
under the supremacy clause, a state court could not hold a property or liberty claim to be
non-justiciable under state law when no other forum is available in which to enforce that
claim.
[Vol. 59:1145]
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law, because a state court which is compelled to resolve federal
claims may also reach the merits of similar state claims. As a juris-
prudential matter, this interpretation of state obligations under the
federal Constitution also assures that a court system is always avail-
able to enforce federal rights and remedies.
This article first discusses some basic principles of state court
jurisdiction and justiciability. Part II explores state courts' obliga-
tion to hear federal claims. In Part III, this article concludes that
state courts are almost always obligated to assume jurisdiction over
justiciable federal claims. Part IV analyzes the duty of state courts to
provide remedies equal or analogous to the remedies which federal
law would provide. Recognition of this duty is crucial because state
courts are frequently unaccustomed to providing remedies of the
breadth required by federal law. State courts, particularly after
Pennhurst, are the primary protectors of state and federal rights as
against many government officials. They thus have an obligation to
exercise their full powers to vindicate those rights.
I. Essential Principles of State Court Jurisdiction and
Justiciability
Three black-letter principles of state court jurisdiction underlie
the justiciability of federal claims in state court. First, the state
courts' constitutional obligation to enforce federal law is premised on
the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution, which
provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.23
The supremacy clause obviously requires that, when a state court
hears federal claims, it must apply federal substantive law.2 4
Second, state courts have concurrent jurisdiction with federal
23 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
24 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). State courts are free to
apply state "procedures" when hearing federal claims, unless these procedures undermine the
substantive federal right. See Dice v. Akron, C. & Y. R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 363 (1952). The
situation is the converse of a federal court sitting in diversity, where the federal court is re-
quired to apply state "substantive" law, but adheres to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938);




courts over all federal claims, unless (a) Congress has restricted juris-
diction to federal courts, either explicitly or impliedly; or (b) there is
a "disabling incompatibility between the federal claim and state
court adjudication. ' 25 Alexander Hamilton first expressed this prin-
ciple of general concurrent jurisdiction in The Federalist, No. 82,
where, construing the supremacy clause, he concluded:
[I]n every case in which [the state courts] were not expressly ex-
cluded by the future acts of the national legislature, they will of
course take cognizance of the causes to which those acts may give
birth . . . . When . . .we consider the State governments and
the national governments, as they truly are, in the light of kin-
dred systems, and as parts of ONE WHOLE, the inference seems
to be conclusive, that the State courts would have a concurrent
25 See Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 477-78 (1981); see also Dowd
Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 507-08 (1962); Redish & Muench, Adjtdication of Federal
Causes of Action in State Court, 75 MICH. L. REv. 311, 313-40 (1976). Congress can restrict
federal constitutional questions to federal courts, Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 511-12
(1944), but only if federal courts have the power to provide adequate remedies for constitu-
tional violations. See genera/ly Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 1109, 1152-53
(1969). Conceivably there would be instances in which the restriction of federal constitu-
tional claims to federal courts would be unconstitutional. For example, assume a state, in
violation of federal law, compelled an individual to pay money into the state treasury, and
this individual brought a due process claim to recover this money. Cf Ward v. Love County,
253 U.S. 17 (1920) (action against county, not directly against state). If Congress had re-
stricted due process claims to federal court, but had not overridden the state's eleventh
amendment immunity pursuant to its powers under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment, the
plaintiff would have no effective remedy because his suit in federal court against the state
treasury would be barred by the eleventh amendment. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651
(1974). In that event, Congress' purported restriction of the federal due process claim to
federal court would be unconstitutional. The plaintiff would have a right to proceed in state
court where there is no eleventh amendment bar. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 9-10
n.7 (1980) (eleventh amendment does not apply to state court proceedings).
The Supreme Court has not held that Congress has power to abrogate a state's eleventh
amendment immunity pursuant to Congress' powers under article I of the Constitution, al-
though lower federal courts have so held. See, e.g., County of Monroe v. Florida, 678 F.2d
1124 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 726 (1983); Peel v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 600
F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1979); Jennings v. Illinois Office of Educ., 589 F.2d 935 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979). If the Supreme Court does not follow the lead of these lower
courts, it would mean that the Constitution mandates that constitutional claims for damages
against the state treasury must be brought in state court, if those constitutional claims do not
arise under the fourteenth amendment. See Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Kassel, 556 F.
Supp. 740 (S.D. Iowa 1983) (dormant commerce clause claim not a "right" under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1343(3) or 42 U.S.C. § 1983); see also Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S.
600 (1979) (supremacy clause claim not a right secured by the Constitution under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1343(3)).
One court has held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates exclusive jurisdiction in the federal
courts. Chamberlain v. Brown, 223 Tenn. 25, 442 S.W.2d 248 (1969). This interpretation of
§ 1983 has been rejected by the Supreme Court. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 3 n.1;
Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 283 n.7 (1980). The Supreme Court, in these cases, did
not decide whether a state court is obligated to hear a § 1983 claim.
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jurisdiction in all cases arising under the laws of the Union,
where it was not expressly prohibited.26
The Supreme Court adopted this view in 1876 in Claftin v.
Houseman.27
Third, Congress has no obligation under article III to create in-
ferior federal courts and can restrict the jurisdiction of the courts that
it does create. 28 Congress' ability to restrict federal jurisdiction im-
plies a state court obligation to assume jurisdiction over federal
claims. It is an essential premise of this article, derived from some of
the principles described in the famous Dialogue of the late Professor
Henry M. Hart, Jr., that an adjudicative forum must always be
available to vindicate federal rights.2 9 State courts are therefore the
ultimate guarantors of federal rights. 30
A state court is obviously not obligated to hear federal claims
which are not justiciable under federal law.31 The Supreme Court
has not yet addressed the federal constitutional question whether a
state court, applying state standards, can hold a justiciable federal
question to be non-justiciable in state court.32 This question arises
26 THE FEDERALIST No. 82, at 536 (A. Hamilton) (E. Earle ed. 1941).
27 93 U.S. 130 (1876). For a detailed discussion of the early historical development of
enforcement of federal causes of action in state courts, see Note, State Enforcement of Federally
Created Rights, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1551, 1551-54 (1960).
28 See, e.g., Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 400-02 (1973). But see note 21 supra.
29 See Hart, Further Note on the Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An
Exercise in Dialectic, HART & WECHSLER, supra note 21, at 330-60; see also Lockerty v. Phillips,
319 U.S. 182 (1943).
30 Id. at 330, 359-60; cf. Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182 (1943) (Congress could have
declined to create inferior federal cc.urts, leaving suitors to the remedies afforded by state
courts); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 86-87 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (the jurisdic-
tion of article III courts is subject to the control of Congress, which may commit matters
within the federal courts' jurisdiction instead to the state courts); St. Joseph Stock Yards Co.
v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 84 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("[t]he Supremacy of law
demands that there shall be opportunity to have some court decide. the ultimate question
of constitutionality").
31 Sager, Insular Majorities Unabated Warth v. Seldin and City of Eastlake v. Forest City
Enterprises, Inc., 91 HARV. L. REV. 1373, 1401 (1978). Professor Sager argues that state
courts can, if they so choose, decide cases that would not be heard in federal court because of
the federal political question and standing doctrines. See also Sager, supra note 2. Paradoxi-
cally, Professor Sager's view that the existence of a constitutional right does not depend on
judicial enforcement would help justify federal court abstention on grounds of non-jus-
ticiability. This article focuses only on the obligation of the state courts to hear federal claims
that are justiciable under federal law.
32 The Supreme Court has held that the mootness of a federal claim in state court is a
question of federal law. Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301 (1964); see also North Carolina v.
Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971); Williams v. Shaffer, 385 U.S. 1037, 1038-39 (1967) (Douglas,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Concrete Technology Corp. v. Laborers' Int'l Union,
3 Wash. App. 869, 479 P.2d 125 (1970). Cf Comments of P. Freund, SUPREME COURT AND
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only when state standards of justiciability, as applied to the federal
claim, are more restrictive than federal standards of justiciability.
The determination whether a given case is justiciable under state law
will generally depend upon the analysis of three factors related to the
proper role of the state court and the separation of powers among the
branches of state government. 33 First, does the state constitution or a
state statute commit the issue to another branch? 34 Second, will a
judicial decision and judicial relief improperly interfere with the op-
erations of other branches of government? 35 Third, can the court
identify and decide the issues and grant relief consistent with its judi-
cial role?36
Unless a constitutional or statutory provision plainly reserves an
issue to another branch of state government, a court holding an issue
to be non-justiciable is refusing to exercise jurisdictional powers that
it possesses.37 Justiciability is different from jurisdiction, although
SUPREME LAW 38 (E. Cahn ed. 1954) (standing to raise federal question in state court should
be considered federal issue). The essential analysis of the Court in Liner was that having once
had jurisdiction over federal claims, the state court had to enforce the substance of the federal
right and could not dismiss federal claims merely because they had become moot under state
law. The Court did not examine whether the state court's mootness doctrine was a valid
jurisdictional excuse relieving the state court of the obligation to hear the federal claim. Cf
Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947) (addressing question whether state court has adequate and
appropriate jurisdiction to hear the claim). Although the reasoning of Liner could be ex-
tended to apply to the justiciability concerns discussed here, the Court's failure to address the
state court's obligation to assume jurisdiction makes such extension unlikely. Forcing a state
court to hear a claim it would otherwise not hear, regardless of when or by whom the claim
was brought, imposes a greater burden upon that court than the obligation to continue to
adjudicate a federal claim over which the state court has already assumed jurisdiction.
33 See, e.g., Jones v. Beame, 45 N.Y.2d 402, 380 N.E.2d 277, 408 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1978).
The Supreme Court has stated that in federal courts the "nonjusticiability of a political ques-
tion is primarily a function of the separation of powers." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210
(1962). A federal court also cannot interfere unduly in state government. Rizzo v. Goode,
423 U.S. 362, 378-80 (1976) (principles of federalism limit federal court injunctive relief
against branches of state government); cf. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973) (interference
with operation of Ohio National Guard). There are restrictions against state court interfer-
ence in federal affairs. Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1871); see also Davis v. Passman,
442 U.S. 228, 245 n.23 (1979).
34 See, e.g., Sweeney v. Tucker, 473 Pa. 493, 375 A.2d 698 (1977). For a discussion of
federal non-justiciable "political questions," see Baker, 369 U.S. at 217; Powell, 395 U.S. at
518; Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 6-7. Although Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), and other cases
have noted the "textual commitment" basis for non-justiciability, this basis was undermined
by Powel. See also HART & WECHSLER, supra note 21, at 235.
35 See, e.g., Jones v. Beame, 45 N.Y.2d 402, 380 N.E.2d 277, 408 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1978);
Baker, 369 U.S. at 217; Powell, 395 U.S. at 548-49, Gilligan; 413 U.S. at 7, 10.
36 See, e.g., Jones v. Beame, 45 N.Y.2d 402, 380 N.E.2d 277, 408 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1978);
Baker, 369 U.S. at 198, 217; Powell, 395 U.S. at 517; Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 8, 10.
37 Commentators have extensively debated the freedom of a federal court to refrain from
deciding legal issues on grounds of non-justiciability. See, e.g., Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960
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they involve similar concerns. Justiciability, unlike jurisdiction, is
generally a judge-made policy restriction on the power of the court.
This article inquires whether state standards of justiciability can ever
excuse a state court from hearing a justiciable federal claim when
jurisdiction is concurrent with that of the federal courts and whether
a state court which holds a federal claim to be non-justiciable under
state law is released from its supremacy clause obligation to hear that
federal claim.
II. State Court Obligation to Hear Federal Claims Generally
Under the teaching of Testa v. Kate38 and subsequent cases, state
courts have a general obligation to hear federal claims. They must
exercise their jurisdiction to the fullest extent to vindicate federal
rights; they may not discriminate against hearing federal claims
when they hear analogous state claims; and, finally, states must
maintain courts with jurisdiction adequate to hear claims that state
and local officials have violated individuals' federal rights.
A. Testa v. Katt
Testa v. Kate, decided by the Supreme Court nearly forty years
ago, remains the seminal case concerning a state court's obligation to
hear federal claims. Congress had provided in the Emergency Price
Control Act that buyers of goods could recover from the seller, for
overcharges, "not more than three times the amount of the over-
charge" 39 "in any court of competent jurisdiction. ' 40 The petitioner,
Term-Forward The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REv. 40, 75 (1961); Henkin, supra note 11;
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1, 7-8, 9 (1959); see
also A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 71-72 (1962). Professor Wechsler has as-
serted that federal courts must decide any issue properly presented unless the Constitution
textually commits the issue to another branch of government. Wechsler, supra, at 7-8, 9. This
concept ofjusticiability is consistent with the principle of constitutional law that an adjudica-
tive forum always be available to protect properly presented rights. Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803); Hart, supra note 29. The late Professor Bickel, on the other hand,
would have allowed federal courts substantial discretion to refuse to decide legal issues
presented for a variety of political (in the colloquial sense) reasons. A. BICKEL, supra, at 172;
Bickel, supra, at 75. Professor Henkin interprets many "political question" cases as holding
only that the equitable relief requested was inappropriate. Henkin, supra note 11, at 617-22.
A state court which adopts Professor Wechsler's views will presumably vindicate all
rights that are justiciable under federal law, unless a state statutory or constitutional provi-
sion plainly bars the state court from hearing these federal claims. The refusal of the state
court to vindicate a justiciable federal right will obviously arise most often when a state court
takes a restrictive view of justiciability.
38 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
39 Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, § 205(e), 56 Stat. 33-34, amended by-ch.
325, 58 Stat. 632, 640 (1944).
40 Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, § 205(e). Congress had required that
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alleging an overcharge, sued under the Act in Rhode Island District
Court. The District Court awarded treble damages, but the Rhode
Island Superior Court, conducting a trial de novo, awarded only the
amount of the overcharge. 4'
The Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed, 42 holding that the
Act was penal, and that consequently Rhode Island courts were not
obligated to enforce it. 4 3 The Rhode Island Supreme Court relied
upon its previous decision in Robinson v. Norato,44 a case brought
under the previous version of the Emergency Price Control Act. The
court in Robinson had held that, because Rhode Island courts had no
jurisdiction under state law to enforce penal statutes of foreign sover-
eigns, they had no jurisdiction over claims arising under the Act,
which the court viewed as penal.45 The Robinson court held that
Rhode Island courts were not unconstitutionally discriminating
against federal claims as long as they treated federal claims as favora-
bly as claims from sister states.4 6
The United States Supreme Court reversed in a decision whose
meaning has been disputed.47 The Court first rejected the Rhode
Island Supreme Court's assumption that a state court was no more
obligated to enforce penal laws of the federal government than those
suit be brought "in the district or county in which the defendant resides or has a place of
business." Id. § 205(c), 56 Stat. 23, 33. Thus there was no need to determine in which state
court a federal suit could be brought, unlike the situation in several Federal Employers' Lia-
bility Act cases, see, e.g., McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 292 U.S. 230 (1934); Douglas v.
New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 279 U.S. 377, 388 (1929).
Curiously, the Supreme Court also referred to § 205(c) of the Emergency Price Control
Act in the second sentence of the opinion, Testa, 330 U.S. at 387, although this section con-
cerned only criminal jurisdiction under the Act. The Court did not subsequently refer to this
provision. Section 205(c) explicitly stated that state and territorial courts had concurrent
jurisdiction for criminal proceedings under the Act. Presumably the Court referred to
§ 205(c) to bolster its assumption that state courts had concurrent jurisdiction of claims under
§ 205(e). On the other hand, the fact that Congress explicitly mandated concurrent jurisdic-
tion under § 205(c), but not under § 205(e), supports the argument that the legislation itself
did not obligate the Rhode Island state courts to hear claims under § 205(e). See text accom-
panying notes 92-93 in/a.
41 330 U.S. at 388. The Rhode Island District Court awarded costs; the Rhode Island
Superior Court awarded attorney's fees.
42 Testa v. Katt, 71 R.I. 472, 47 A.2d 312 (1946).
43 Id.
44 71 R.I. 256, 43 A.2d 467 (1945).
45 Id. at 265-72, 43 A.2d at 471-75.
46 Id. at 270-72, 43 A.2d at 474-75.
47 See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 56 (1978), at 137-38 n.36; Hart,
supra note 29, at 330; Redish & Muench, supra note 25, at 351-59; Sandalow, Henry v. Missis-
sippi and the Adequate State Ground- Proposalsfor a Revised Doctrine, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 187, 207-
08; Note, supra note 27.
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of sister states.48 Such an assumption, the Court held, flew in the face
of the supremacy clause. 49 The Court then reviewed historical devel-
opments and precedents, emphasizing its decisions in Claftin v. House-
man50 and Mondou v. New York, New Haven & Harford Railroad.5
According to the Court, Clafln taught that the states could not treat
federal law as foreign law 5 2 and that "the obligation of states to en-
force these federal laws is not lessened by reason of the form in which
they are cast or the remedy which they provide." 53 Mondou, the
Court stated, held that a state court could not decline to entertain a
federal action on the ground that the action was contrary to state
policy.54
From its reading of Claflin and Mondou, the Court concluded that
Rhode Island's "established policy against enforcement by its courts
of statutes of other states and the United States which it deems penal,
cannot be accepted as a 'valid excuse.' ,,55 It stressed that "the policy
48 330 U.S. at 389.
49 Id.
50 93 U.S. 130 (1876).
51 223 U.S. 1 (1912).
52 330 U.S. at 390-91.
53 Id. at 391. The text of the Claflin opinion does not appear to support this broad asser-
tion. Clafgin stated: "If an act of Congress gives a penalty to a party aggrieved, without
specifying a remedy for its enforcement, there is no reason why it should not be enforced, if
not provided otherwise by some act of Congress, by a proper action in a State court." 93 U.S.
130, 137 (1876). This language, quoted in Testa, 330 U.S. at 391, is the only reference to a
"remedy" in the Claflin opinion, and it appears to refer to the forum (state or federal) avail-
able to a litigant for enforcing his federal rights.
54 330 U.S. at 392.
55 Id. The Court took the term "valid excuse" from its decision in Douglas v. New York,
N.H. & H.R.R., 279 U.S. 377, 388 (1929), to which the Court referred with a "cf" citation.
Douglas held that the Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA") did not require a New York
state court to hear a claim when the injuries were inflicted in Connecticut, and the defendant
was a Connecticut corporation, although doing business in New York. See also Missouri ex rel.
S. Ry. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1 (1950) (state forum non conveniens doctrine can bar FELA
action).
Cases such as Douglas and Mayfid are only tangentially related to Testa. They concern
the power of a state court to refuse to adjudicate federal claims when other state courts are
available. Obviously there must be a sufficient connection between the federal claim asserted
and the location where suit is brought before a state court is obligated to hear the claim.
Congress can, as in the Emergency Price Control Act in Testa, prescribe the method for deter-
mining the appropriate state court to hear the federal claim. See note 40 supra. But cf. Bain-
bridge v. Merchants & Miners Transp. Co., 287 U.S. 278, 280 (1932) (court reluctant to
impute intention of Congress to prescribe state venue for federal claims, leaves open question
whether Congress has this power); Hill, supra note 24, at 401 (it is far from certain that federal
law can confer venue). If Congress does not prescribe such a method, this essentially proce-
dural concern is left to state law, in the absence of state discrimination against the federal
claim. McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 292 U.S. 230 (1934). The failure of the state court to
hear the federal claim on venue grounds is unrelated to the substance of the claim; the state
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of the federal Act is the prevailing policy in every state."'56
The Court appeared to narrow its decision in the last paragraph
of the opinion. There it stated that a Rhode Island court had en-
forced a double damage claim under the federal Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act 57 and that the Rhode Island courts would concededly
enforce the same kind of claim at issue in Testa if brought under state
law.58 The Court concluded: "Rhode Island courts have jurisdiction
adequate and appropriate under established local law to adjudicate
this action."'59 It cited three Rhode Island statutes in support of this
statement, two of which vested the Rhode Island courts with general
jurisdiction over claims for the amount sought by the plaintiff.60 The
third statute defined jurisdiction over fines, penalties, and forfeit-
ures.6 ' In view of these jurisdictional statutes, Rhode Island courts
could not refuse enforcement of petitioner's federal claims. 62
Testa thus involves two distinct approaches: it finds a state court
obligation to hear federal claims that overcomes any policy of judi-
cial restraint against hearing those claims, and it forbids discrimina-
court will hear the identical claim if there is a sufficient nexus to the forum state. This situa-
tion must be contrasted with Testa and Mondou (and cases seeking institutional reform) in
which only one state court system is available. Testa's reference to Douglas with a "e. 'citation
indicates that the latter case has only limited significance for the obligation addressed here.
56 330 U.S. at 393. The Court then ruled that cases which held that states are not re-
quired by the full faith and credit clause to enforce judgments of courts of other states arising
out of penal statutes were not relevant. Id at 393-94. According to the Court, the only issue
presented was "the right of a state to deny enforcement to claims growing out of a valid
federal law." d. at 394.
57 Id. (citing Newman v. George A. Fuller Co., 72 R.I. 113, 48 A.2d 345 (1946)). In
Newman, the Rhode Island Supreme Court distinguished Robinson v. Noralo, and held that the
Fair Labor Standards Act was a remedial, not a penal, statute. The Rhode Island court
reasoned that the double damage provision compensated workers for damages too obscure
and difficult of proof.
58 The Court cited no instances in which Rhode Island courts had heard similar Rhode
Island claims.
59 Testa, 330 U.S. at 394.
60 Testa, 330 U.S. at 394 n.13. The Court cited R.I. GEN. LAws ch. 500, § 28; ch. 525,
§ 7; ch. 631, § 4 (1938). Chapter 500, § 28 provided the Rhode Island District Court with
exclusive original jurisdiction for claims seeking less than $1,000 in damages. Chapter 525,
§ 7 allowed appeal from the district court to the Rhode Island Superior Court, which held a
trial de novo.
61 Chapter 631, § 4, provided that fines, penalties, and forfeitures of $500 and less be
prosecuted in the Rhode Island District Court and that fines of more than $500 be prosecuted
in the Superior Court.
62 Id Professor Wechsler, pointing out the differences in tone between the final para-
graph of the Testa opinion and the rest of the decision, has speculated that the final paragraph
may have been a concession to Justices who thought, as Justice Frankfurter did, that there
were limits to federal mandates to state courts. See, e.g., Brown v. Gerdes, 321 U.S. 178, 188
(1944) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Letter from Herbert Wechsler to the authors (Jan. 13,
1984) (on file with the Notre Dame Law Review).
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tion by the states against federal claims when the state courts can
hear analogous state claims.
1. Prior Precedents and State Judicial Policy
Although purportedly based upon prior Supreme Court deci-
sions in Cladfin and Mondou, Testa endorsed a broader state court obli-
gation to assume jurisdiction over federal claims than did either of
those two cases. Clajlin held only that state courts have concurrent
jurisdiction with federal courts over federal questions when federal
jurisdiction is not exclusive and when state courts are ''competent to
decide rights of the like character and class."' 63 The obligation of the
state court to exercise that jurisdiction was not at issue in Clafin,6 4 as
it was in Testa.
Mondou, on the other hand, did concern the state court's duty to
take jurisdiction. The Connecticut courts had declined to enforce
rights arising under the Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA")
primarily because the policy of FELA was inconsistent with Connect-
icut's policy regarding employers' liability to their employees for job-
related injuries, and also because it would purportedly be inconve-
nient and confusing for a court to apply two different standards. 65
The Supreme Court held that the Connecticut Superior Court was
required to hear the federal claims because the Connecticut court's
jurisdiction, as prescribed by local law, was adequate for the occa-
sion.66 Jurisdiction was adequate because the Superior Court was a
court of general jurisdiction, and it heard personal injury and wrong-
ful death claims when those claims arose under the laws of Connecti-
cut or other states.67 Connecticut could not decline to enforce FELA
merely because Connecticut policy was different; the Connecticut
court was to treat the federal policy as if it emanated from the Con-
necticut legislature. The Court doubted that enforcing FELA would
cause much confusion in the Connecticut courts, but even if it did,
63 93 U.S. 130, 137 (1876); see also Note, supra note 27, at 1555. The Court in Clafi'n in
one passage equated competency to hear federal claims with the ability of the state court
under the state constitution to take jurisdiction. 93 U.S. at 136.
64 93 U.S. at 137. The Court did stress that state courts were just as bound to recognize
federal law as state law, thereby implying a duty to exercise jurisdiction. Id.; see 16 C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER, L. COOPER & E. GROSSMAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 4024 (1977) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER].
65 223 U.S. at 55-56. The Connecticut court also held that the federal act impliedly
limited enforcement to federal courts. Id. at 55. The Supreme Court rejected this argument.
Id. at 56.
66 Id. at 57-59.
67 Id. at 57.
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"[t]he existence of the jurisdiction creates an implication of duty to
exercise it, and that its exercise may be onerous does not militate
against that implication. '68
The Supreme Court could have supported its decision in Testa
merely by clarifying the holding of Mondou. The Court could have
pointed out the Rhode Island Supreme Court's obvious misinterpre-
tation of Mondou. This misinterpretation arose from the Rhode Is-
land court's complete reliance on the Mondou Court's passing
comment that Connecticut courts heard similar claims from other
states.69 The Rhode Island court thus ignored the central points of
Mondou-that jurisdiction was appropriate because the state trial
court was one of general jurisdiction and that Connecticut courts
heard the same kind of claim under Connecticut law.
The Court in Testa, however, did not address the Rhode Island
court's misinterpretation of Mondou. Instead, Testa relied on the por-
tion of Mondou holding that the Connecticut court could not refuse to
enforce FELA on the ground that the underlying substantive policy
of that Act conflicted with Connecticut's substantive policy. Yet the
state court in Testa had considered any conflict between the substan-
tive law of Rhode Island and that of the United States irrelevant to
its opinion. The state court had decided as it did because thejurisdic-
tional policy of Rhode Island courts was not to hear penal claims
based on laws other than Rhode Island's. 70 This policy of judicial
restraint, however, conflicted with the state court's duty under the
supremacy clause. 7' The Supreme Court interpreted Mondou not sim-
68 Id. at 58. The Supreme Court also stated that it was not unusual for a court to apply
different rules of law to similar factual situations, and that courts may not decline jurisdiction
merely because the law they generally applied was different from the law to be applied in the
case presented. Id. at 58-59.
69 Robinson v. Norato, 71 R.I. 256, 266-72, 43 A.2d 467, 472-75 (1945).
70 One commentator has claimed that the Supreme Court treated the Rhode Island
court's refusal to enforce the federal Emergency Price Control Act "as an attempt to interpose
that state's own notion of wartime price control policy." See B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS
ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 359 (1963). This view derives little support from the Supreme
Court opinion. In Robinson, the Rhode Island Supreme Court questioned whether the federal
Emergency Price Control Act was a constitutional exercise of Congress' power to wage and
declare war, but assumed that the Act was constitutional. 71 R.I. at 257, 43 A.2d at 468. The
Rhode Island court never intimated that it disagreed with the substantive policy of the fed-
eral Act.
71 Testa clearly prohibits state court refusal to hear federal claims because of a policy of
judicial restraint (as opposed to a lack of power under state statutes or the state constitution).
When, on the other hand, statutory or state constitutional provisions limit the state
courts'jurisdiction (or the state courts have legitimately interpreted these provisions as limit-
ing their jurisdiction), and there has been no discrimination against the federal claims, the
decision in Testa does not require that the state courts assume jurisdiction. As argued below,
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ply to prohibit discrimination against federal claims, but more
broadly as holding that a state doctrine ofjudicial restraint could not
justify state court refusal to enforce federal rights. 72
2. General Jurisdiction
The proposition that a state court may not rely upon state doc-
trines of judicial restraint to avoid enforcing federal rights is consis-
tent with the last paragraph of the Testa opinion. In that paragraph
the Court noted that Rhode Island had adequate and appropriate
jurisdiction to hear the federal claims, 73 citing the statutory provi-
sions which gave Rhode Island courts general jurisdiction over claims
of the amount in question. 74 The Court noted that the Rhode Island
courts concededly heard similar claims under Rhode Island law and
could hear federal claims for double damages. The Court, however,
never suggested that either of these facts was the specific reason why
however, state legislatures have an obligation to create courts with jurisdiction to hear certain
federal claims, and all states have courts with general jurisdiction capable of hearing all fed-
eral claims. See note 76 infra and text accompanying notes 100-22 infra. But cf note 77 infra
(statute limiting jurisdiction of New Mexico courts over federal claims).
72 The Connecticut court in Mondou alleged that applying the substantively different fed-
eral laws would cause confusion in the Connecticut courts. Thus this state court attempted to
transform a substantive difference into a concern of judicial administration. See text accom-
panying notes 65-68 supra.
The Supreme Court doubted that there would be any confusion or inconvenience if Con-
necticut courts were to enforce the federal Act. It indicated that Connecticut's purported
concern with judicial confusion was merely a subterfuge for a substantive policy difference.
Thus, the Supreme Court's primary response to the state court's assertion was that a state
court could not evade its responsibility to enforce federal law merely by transforming a sub-
stantive policy difference into an issue of state court administration. Cf, e.g., Ward v. Love
County, 253 U.S. 17 (1920) (where plaintiffs were clearly coerced into paying illegal tax, state
court "finding" that tax was paid voluntarily was not an adequate and independent state
ground to bar Supreme Court review).
The Supreme Court did add, however, that even if the state court's exercise ofjurisdic-
tion was onerous, there was still an "implication of duty to exercise it." Mondou, 223 U.S. at
58. Thus Mondou rejected the Connecticut court's reasoning that state judicial policy-in this
case a palpably frivolous policy-excused the state court from exercising jurisdiction over a
federal claim. This portion of Mondou would have provided support for the decision in Testa,
but the Court in Testa referred only to that portion of Mondou concerning the irrelevance of
substantive differences between state and federal substantive policy, Testa, 330 U.S. at 392-93,
not to the discussion of the alleged burden on the state courts.
73 330 U.S. at 394.
74 The Rhode Island District Court, in which suit was brought, had general jurisdiction
over claims of less than S 1,000. The Superior Court had jurisdiction for claims of $ 1,000 and
more. See note 60 supra. The Court also cited the provision giving the District Court jurisdic-
tion over claims for fines, penalties, and forfeitures of $500 and less. Id. at 387 n.1; see note 61
supra. If no Rhode Island provision had specifically granted jurisdiction over fines, penalties,
and forfeitures, undoubtedly the general jurisdictional provisions would have given the
Rhode Island courts power to hear the claims in Testa.
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Rhode Island courts were required to exercise jurisdiction. Rather,
the Court appears to have cited these two examples as evidence that
Rhode Island courts did have adequate and appropriate jurisdiction.
Because Rhode Island courts had general jurisdiction and jurisdic-
tion over fines, penalties, and forfeitures, they were empowered to
hear the treble damage Emergency Price Control Act claim. The
state court's policy of judicial restraint had to yield to its federal con-
stitutional obligation to enforce federal law. Similarly, the Supreme
Court had determined in Mondou that state court jurisdiction was ad-
equate and appropriate primarily because that state court had gen-
eral jurisdiction.
The result would have been the same in Testa even if Rhode
Island courts never heard "penal" claims under which multiple dam-
ages were awarded. The general jurisdiction of the state courts was
adequate and appropriate for the courts to hear the statutory over-
charge claim, and no state policy against awarding multiple damages
could have overridden the policy of the federal Act. The state courts
could not decline to exercise the general jurisdiction with which they
were vested. In addition, as a practical matter, it would be absurd to
suggest that a Rhode Island court was fully competent to identify the
legal issues and conduct a trial to determine liability and calculate
damages, but incompetent to multiply damages by three.
Indeed, the key to determining the obligation of the state courts
to hear federal claims, as some state courts have recognized, 75 is that
every state has a court system of general jurisdiction, with common
law and equitable powers.76 Thus, unless a state constitutional or
75 See text accompanying note 89 infra.
76 A "court system of general jurisdiction" means, here, a system that includes some
court that has original jurisdiction over any claim, including claims for monetary, injunctive,
habeas, and mandamus relief. With the exception of four states, each state has one state court
with original jurisdiction over most legal and equitable claims. See ALA. CONST. amend. 328,
§ 6.04; ALA. CODE § 12-11-30 (1975); ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 3, ALASKA STAT. § 22.10.020
(1982); ARIZ. CONST. art. VI, § 14, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-123 (1956); ARK. CONST.
art. 7, § 11 (common law), § 15 (equity), ARK. STAT. ANN. § 22-301 (1962) (common law),
§ 22-404 (1962) (equity); CAL. CONsT. art. 6, § 10; COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 9; CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 51-16-45 (West 1983 Supp.); DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 7 (common law), § 10
(equity), DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 541 (1953) (common law), § 341 (1953) (equity); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 11-921 (1981); FLA. CONST. art. 5, § 20(c)(3), FLA. STAT. ANN. § 6.012 (West
1974); GA. CONST. art. VI, § V, % 1; GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2613 (1981); HAWAII REV. STAT.
§ 603 21.5 (1976), § 603-21.8 (1976); IDAHO CONST., art. V, § 20, IDAHO CODE § 1-705
(1979); ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 9, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 72.25 (Smith-Hurd 1972), IND.
CODE ANN. § 33-4-4-3 (Burns 1975); IOWA CONST. art. V, § 6, IOWA CODE ANN. § 602.1
(West 1975); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 20-301 (1981); Ky. REV. STAT. § 23A.010 (1980); LA.
CONST. art. V. § 16; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 105 (1983-84 Supp.); MD. CTS. & JUD.
PROC. CODE ANN. § 1-501 (1984); MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch. 212, § 4 (MICHIE/LAw. Co-op
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statutory provision limits this general jurisdiction, 77 all states have
1974); MICH. CONsT. art. VI, § 13, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.601, 600, 605, 600.611
(West 1981); MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 3, MINN. STAT. § 484.01 (1971); Miss. CONST. art. 6,
§ 156 (vesting original jurisdiction not vested elsewhere in circuit courts), §§ 159-161 (vesting
equity and other jurisdiction in chancery court); Miss. CODE ANN. § 9-5-81 (1972); (chancery
court jurisdiction), § 9-7-81 (circuit court jurisdiction); Mo. CONST. art. V, § 14. Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 478.070 (Vernon Supp. 1984); MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 4, MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-
5-302 (1983); NEB. CONST. art. V, § 9, NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-302 (1979); NEV. CONST. art. 6,
§ 6, N.H. CONST. Pt. 2d, art. 72-a, N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 491:7, 498:1 (1983); N.J.
CONST. art. VI, § III; N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 13, but see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-1-8 (1981),
providing that no court of the state of New Mexico shall have jurisdiction over any action
instituted under a federal statute where the Congress of the United States has curtailed the
right of the United States district courts to enforce such statute; see note 77 infia; N.Y. CONST.
art. VI, § 7; N.Y. JUD. LAW § 140-b (McKinney 1983); N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 12, N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 7A-240 (1981); N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 8, N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-05-06 (Supp. 1983);
OHIO CONST. art IV, § 4, art. 4 § 3; OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.01 (Baldwin 1981);
OKLA. CONST. art. 7, § 4, 7; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 91.1 (West Supp. 1983); OR. CONST.
art. VII, § 9; PA. CONST. art. V, § 5; 42 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 931 (Purdon 1981); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 8-2-13 (1969); S.C. CONST. art. V, § 5, 7; S.D. CONST. art. V, § 5; S.D. CODI-
FIED LAWS ANN. § 16-6-8, 16-6-9 (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-11-101 (1980) (vesting eq-
uity jurisdiction in chancery court), 16-10-101 (1980) (vesting general jurisdiction in circuit
court); TEx. CONST. art. 5, § 8, TEx. STAT. ANN. art. 1906, 1909 (Vernon 1964); UTAH
CONST. art. VIII, §§ 5, 7; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2 (1977), § 78-3-4 (Supp. 1983); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 113 (Supp. 1983); VA. CONST. art. VI, § 1, VA. CODE § 17-123 (1982);
WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 6; WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 2.08.010 (1961); W. VA. CONST. art.
VIII, § 6, W. VA. CODE § 51-2-2 (1981); WIS. CONST. art. VII, § 8, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 753.03
(West 1981); WYO. CONST. art. 5, § 10.
Original jurisdiction over certain types of cases, such as those involving decedents or
monetary claims against the state, and claims involving a small amount of money, is often
lodged in a separate court. By court system of general jurisdiction or court of general jurisdic-
tion, this article refers to all the courts of the state.
77 Only one provision of state law has been uncovered that would currently interfere
with the power of a state court to hear a federal question. A New Mexico statute provides:
No court of the state of New Mexico shall have jurisdiction of, or enter any
order of decree of any character in any action instituted or attempted to be insti-
tuted in the courts of this state, seeking to enforce, directly or indirectly, any federal
statute, or rule or regulation described in Section 1 hereof, where the congress of the
United States has curtailed, withdrawn or denied the district courts of the United
States the right to enforce such statutes, rules or regulations aforesaid.
N.M. STAT. ANN. 34-1-8 (1978).
Section 1, not codified, reads:
The legislature of the state of New Mexico hereby finds that: (a) the congress of
the United States has heretofore authorized, and may hereafter authorize, by con-
gressional act, the courts of the several states to entertain jurisdiction of and enforce
causes of action created by or arising from federal statutes, or by rules or regulations
of federal regulating bodies or agencies, and
(b) The congress has no power to require the state courts of the several states to
take cognizance of such actions, and
(c) The congress has from time to time, and may hereafter, withdraw from the
courts of the United States jurisdiction to enforce such statutes or rules or regula-
tions aforesaid or to entertain actions for such purpose or to enter judgments or
decrees based thereupon, and
(d) In such event actions to enforce such statutes or rules or regulations afore-
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courts with adequate and appropriate jurisdiction to vindicate all
federal rights.78 The obligation to vindicate those rights does not
burden the state courts with unfamiliar tasks because state and fed-
eral courts are similar institutions with nearly identical functions.
3. Subsequent Interpretations of Testa
Subsequent decisions interpreting Testa support the proposition
that state courts of general jurisdiction must hear all properly-
presented federal claims when jurisdiction is concurrent. The only
subsequent Supreme Court decision to refer to Testa at length is the
recent case of Federal Energy Regulatoy Commission v. Mississi~pp 9
("FERC"), in which the Court held that the Mississippi Public Serv-
ice Commission was required to hear claims arising under the Public
Utility Regulating Policies Act of 1978.80 The Court extended Testa
to govern state commissions and held that the tenth amendment's
reservation of powers to the states, revivified in National League of Cit-
ies v. Usegy, 81 did not bar this extension of Testa.82 The FERC Court
rejected a lower federal court's holding that forcing the Mississippi
commission to assume jurisdiction over the federal claims unconstitu-
tionally interfered with state sovereignty.
The Court stated in FERC that the Mississippi commission was
obligated to hear the federal claims because it heard analogous state
claims, but the Court did not analyze the kinds of state claims the
commission actually heard. The Court was content that the commis-
said, or rights or obligations arising therefrom may hereafter be instituted in the
courts of this state, burdening and taxing such courts, and placing upon the courts
and people of the state the burden and expense of enforcing such federal statutes,
rules or regulations, or setting disputes arising therefrom.
The statute was enacted in 1947, the same year Testa was decided. The provision would
undoubtedly unconstitutionally discriminate against federal laws. The absurd result wrought
if this statute were ever applied would be that no court would be available to vindicate a
federal right over which Congress had withdrawn federal court jurisdiction. This result is
entirely contrary to the states' obligation to uphold the federal Constitution and federal law.
See notes 29-30 supra and accompanying text. Finally, no "burden" or "expense" such as that
described in § 1 could possibly justify state court refusal to hear federal claims in the face of
the demands of the supremacy clause.
78 Other commentators have also recognized this simple solution to most Testa problems.
See 16 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 64, at 718; Redish & Muench, supra note 25, at 355.
79 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
80 Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978).
81 426 U.S. 833 (1976). In NationalLeague ofCities, the Supreme Court held that the tenth
amendment prohibited Congress from establishing minimum wages and maximum hours for
state employees who performed "traditional governmental functions." 426 U.S. at 852. The
tenth amendment thus restricted Congress' power to legislate under article I. Id.
82 456 U.S. at 760-62.
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sion engaged in dispute resolution. Because the commission heard
disputes based on state law, it was obligated to hear disputes based
on federal law.83 Hearing these federal claims did not force the com-
mission to undertake an entirely unfamiliar function. In addition,
the FERC Court emphasized the broad language of Testa: federal
policy prevails,8 4 and "the obligation of states to enforce these federal
laws is not lessened by reason of the form in which they are cast or
the remedy which they provide. '8 5
State courts that have recently faced the issues presented in
Testa have arrived at uniformly consistent results: these state courts
have assumed jurisdiction over federal claims. 86 The decisions have
83 Id. at 760-61. The Court cited various Mississippi statutory provisions concerning the
powers of the Mississippi Public Service Commission. The most relevant provisions, §§ 77-3-
13(3) and 77-3-21 (1973), authorized the state commission to hold hearings when determining
whether to issue a certificate allowing the operation or construction of an electric facility or
when determining whether service was reasonably adequate. The analogy between this func-
tion and resolving disputes " 'between qualifying facilities and electric utilities arising under'
[the federal act]," 456 U.S. at 760, is not a close one by any standard.
84 456 U.S. at 760; see also id. at 762 (state commission obligated to consider federal
standards).
85 Id. at 769, discussing the obligation of the state court to hear federal claims that the
state commission failed to consider the federal standards. Here the Court found a "seemingly
precise parallel" between Mississippi judicial review of the state commission and the judicial
review called for by the federal Act. Id. at 769 n.31.
The Court also held that Congress could provide that federal rights be enforced through
state adjudicatory machinery. Id. at 761. The Court wrote, relying on Testa, that the federal
government has "some power to enlist a branch of state government-there the judiciary-to
further federal ends." Id. at 762.
Other federal decisions have discussed Testa, albeit briefly. In Martinez v. California,
444 U.S. 277 (1980), the Court reserved decision on the question whether a state court was
obligated to entertain a § 1983 claim, noting that "where the same type of claim, if arising
under state law, would be enforced in the state courts, the state courts are generally not free to
refuse enforcement of the federal claim." Id. at 283-84 n.7. In Palmore v. United States, 411
U.S. 389, 402 (1973), the Court referred to Testa as holding that "Congress could constitution-
ally require state courts to hear and decide Emergency Price Control Act cases involving the
enforcement of federal penal laws .... "
Other federal judges have taken a broader view of Testa. Justice Marshall, concurring in
Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare,
411 U.S. 279, 298 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring), stated that the Missouri courts would
have had a constitutional obligation to hear the Federal Labor Standards Act claim in issue
because these state courts had general jurisdiction, were competent to hear suits of a like
character, and were co-equal partners with the federal courts to enforce federal law and the
federal Constitution. Some federal courts have assumed that state courts have an obligation
to enforce actions under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). See New Jersey-Phila-
delphia Presbytery v. New Jersey State Bd. of Higher Educ., 654 F.2d 868 (3d Cir. 1981);
International Prisoners' Union v. Rizzo, 356 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
86 Recent state cases discussing Testa and assuming jurisdiction over federal claims are:
E.A. v. Alaska, 623 P.2d 1210, 1215 n.13 (Alaska 1981); New Times, Inc. v. Arizona Bd. of
Regents, 110 Ariz. 367, 374, 519 P.2d 169, 176 (1974); Williams v. Horvath, 16 Cal. 3d 834,
836, 548 P.2d 1125, 1127, 129 Cal. Rptr. 453 (1976); McCarroll v. Los Angeles County Dist.
[ 1984]
JUSTICIABILITY
all implicitly recognized that state courts of general jurisdiction must
vindicate federal rights when jurisdiction is concurrent. The reason-
ing in these decisions, however, has varied. Some state courts have
held that they are obligated to assume jurisdiction over all federal
claims when federal jurisdiction has not been made exclusivey while
others have held that they must take jurisdiction because they hear
similar state claims.88 Several state courts have explicitly stated that
Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal. 2d 45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958);
Perry v. American Fin. Corp., 372 A.2d 224 (Del. Super. Ct. 1977); Mountain States Tel. &
Tel. Co. v. Boise Redevelopment Agency, 101 Idaho 30, 607 P.2d 1084 (1980); United Mo.
Bank v. Robinson, 7 Kan. App. 2d 120, 638 P.2d 372 (1981); Concerned Citizens of Rapides
Parish v. Hardy, No. 8110, slip op. (La. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 1981); Maryland Comm. For Fair
Representation v. Tawes, 228 Md. 412, 180 A.2d 656 (1962), afd, 229 Md. 406, 184 A.2d 715,
rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 377 U.S. 656 (1964); Normand v. Barkei, 385 Mass. 851, 434
N.E.2d 631 (1982); Scholle v. Hare, 367 Mich. 176, 116 N.W.2d 350 (1962), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 990 (1964); Dudley v. Bell, 50 Mich. App. 678, 213 N.W.2d 805 (1973); Lewis v. Delta
Loans, Inc., 300 So. 2d 142 (Miss. 1970); State v. Banks, 454 S.W.2d 498 (Mo. 1970); MacNeil
v. Klein, 141 N.J. Super. 394, 358 A.2d 488 (1976); Doe v. Bridgeton Hosp. Ass'n, 130 N.J.
Super. 416, 327 A.2d 448 (1974), rev'd on other grounds, 71 N.J. 478, 366 A.2d 641, cert. denied,
433 U.S. 914 (1977); Travel Agents Malpractice Action Corps v. Regal Cultural Soc'y, Inc.,
118 N.J. Super. 184, 287 A.2d 4 (1972); Bess v. Toia, 66 A.2d 844 (Conn. 1978); Felder v.
Foster, 107 Misc. 2d 782, 436 N.Y.S.2d 675 (Monroe County Sup. Ct. 1981); Brody v. Leamy,
90 Misc. 2d 1, 393 N.Y.S.2d 243 (Dutchess County Sup. Ct. 1977); Vickers v. Home Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 87 Misc. 2d 880, 386 N.Y.S.2d 291 (Monroe County Sup. Ct. 1976); Holt
v. City of Troy, 78 Misc. 2d 9, 355 N.Y.S.2d 94 (Rensselaer County Sup. Ct. 1974); Judo, Inc.
v. Peet, 68 Misc. 2d 281, 326 N.Y.S.2d 441 (N.Y. County Civ. Ct, 1971); Seamen v. Fedou-
rich, 45 Misc. 2d 940, 258 N.Y.S.2d 152 (Broome County Sup. Ct. 1965); Snuggs v. Stanly
County City Dep't of Pub. Health, 63 N.C. App. 86, 303 S.E.2d 646 (1983); Hoffman v.
Wagner, 149 Ohio St. 50, 77 N.E.2d 467 (1948); Lakewood Homes, Inc. v. Board of Adjust-
ment, 23 Ohio Misc. 211, 258 N.E.2d 470 (1970), a.d in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 25
Ohio App. 2d 125, 267 N.E.2d 595 (1971); Household Consumer Discount Co. v. Vespaziani,
490 Pa. 209, 415 A.2d 689 (1980); Sweeney v. Tucker, 473 Pa. 493, 375 A.2d 698 (1977);
Commonwealth v. Creamer, 464 Pa. 2, 345 A.2d 702 (1975); Woonsocket Historical Soc'y v.
City of Woonsocket, 120 R.I. 259, 387 A.2d 530 (1978); Terry v. Kolski, 78 Wis. 2d 475, 254
N.W.2d 704 (1977); Vogt v. Nelson, 69 Wis. 2d 125, 230 N.W.2d 123 (1975). But cf. Zorick v.
Tynes, 372 So. 2d 133 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979), in which the court first apparently held that
it had no duty to assume jurisdiction because federal courts would be better able to hear and
enforce the federal claim, but then proceeded to reject the federal claim on the merits.
87 See E.A. v. Alaska, 623 P.2d 1210, 1215 n.13 (Alaska 1981); United Mo. Bank v.
Robinson, 7 Kan. App. 2d 120, 638 P.2d 372 (1981); Judo, Inc. v. Peet, 68 Misc. 2d 281, 326
N.Y.S.2d 441 (N.Y. County Civ. Ct. 1971); Seamen v. Fedourich, 45 Misc. 2d 940, 258
N.Y.S.2d 152 (Broome County Sup. Ct. 1965); Woonsocket Historical Soc'y v. City of Woon-
socket, 120 R.I. 259, 387 A.2d 530 (1978); Terry v. Kolski, 78 Wis. 2d 475, 254 N.W.2d 704
(1977); Vogt v. Nelson, 69 Wis. 2d 125, 230 N.W.2d 123 (1975).
88 New Times, Inc. v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 110 Ariz. 367, 519 P.2d 169, 176 (1974);
McCarroll v. Los Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal. 2d 45, 315 P.2d 322
(1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958); Perry v. American Fin. Corp., 372 A.2d 224 (Del.
Super. 1977); Travel Agents Malpractice Action Corps v. Regal Cultural Soc'y, Inc., 118 NJ.
Super. 184, 287 A.2d 4 (1972); Snuggs v. Stanly County City Dep't of Pub. Health, 63 N.C.
App. 86, 203 S.E.2d 646 (1983); Household Consumer Discount Co. v. Vespaziani, 490 Pa.
209, 415 A.2d 689 (1980); Sweeney v. Tucker, 473 Pa. 493, 375 A.2d 698 (1977).
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state courts of general jurisdiction are obligated to hear federal
claims when jurisdiction is concurrent.8 9
4. Non-Discrimination
Some commentators have interpreted Testa narrowly, relying
entirely on language in the last paragraph without regard to the
more expansive language in the body of the opinion.90 These com-
mentators have interpreted Testa as a pure non-discrimination case
which holds that a state court must hear federal claims if it hears
similar state claims. It has even been implied that Testa stands only
for the proposition that Congress can expressly direct state courts to
hear analogous federal claims.91
Testa, however, clearly did not rely on an express direction from
Congress. Section 205(e) of the federal Emergency Price Control Act
had provided only that claims thereunder could be brought "in any
court of competent jurisdiction"; 92 Congress did not expressly direct
state courts to assume jurisdiction. Rather, the state courts' obliga-
tion to do so apparently derived purely from the supremacy clause
because Congress had not made federal jurisdiction exclusive. 93
Interpretations of Testa that focus on a state court's duty not to
89 See Williams v. Horvath, 16 Cal. 3d 834, 548 P.2d 1125, 1127, 129 Cal. Rptr. 453
(1976); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Boise Redevelopment Agency, 101 Idaho 30, 607
P.2d 1084 (1980); Lewis v. Delta Loans, Inc., 300 So. 2d 142 (Miss. 1974); Brody v. Leamy, 90
Misc. 2d 1, 393 N.Y.S.2d 243 (Dutchess County Sup. Ct. 1977).
90 See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 47, at 137-38 n.36; FERC, 456 U.S. at 784 (1982)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
91 See Note, Utilization of State Courts to Enforce Federal Penal and Criminal Statutes: Develop-
ment inJudicial Federalism, 60 HARV. L. REV. 966, 971 (1947); FERC, 456 U.S. at 773-74 n.4
(Powell, J., dissenting). Even a narrow interpretation of Testa would place a broader obliga-
tion on state courts than that expressed by Justice Frankfurter in his concurring opinion in
Brown v. Gerdes, 321 U.S. 178, 188 (1944), an opinion not referred to in Testa. In Gerdes,
Justice Frankfurter wrote:
Since 1789, rights derived from federal law could be enforced in state courts unless
Congress confined their enforcement to the federal courts. This has been so pre-
cisely for the same reason that rights created by the British Parliament or by the
Legislature of Vermont could be enforced in New York courts. Neither Congress
nor the British Parliament nor the Vermont Legislature has power to confer juris-
diction upon the New York courts. But the jurisdiction conferred upon them by the
only authority that has power to create them and to confer jurisdiction upon
them-namely the law-making power of the State of New York-enables them to
enforce rights no matter what the legislative source of the right may be.
92 See note 40 supra; see also Cullison, State Courts, State Law, and Concurrent Jurisdiction of
Federal Questions, 48 IowA L. REV. 230, 239 (1963).
93 Professor Sandalow has suggested that state courts should be obligated to hear federal
statutory claims only if Congress has declared that state courts must enforce these federal
rights. Sandalow, supra note 47, at 207. But see Redish & Muench, supra note 25, at 346-47.
For Professor Sandalow, the fact that it would be "unseemly" for state courts to decline juris-
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discriminate against federal claims do find some support in the opin-
ion.9 4 The Testa Court noted that Rhode Island courts concededly
diction over federal claims is not an adequate justification for obligating them to assume
jurisdiction when jurisdiction is concurrent. Sandalow, supra note 47 at 206.
Professor Sandalow's suggestion that the Supreme Court indicated in Testa that it would
be unseemly for a state court to refuse to adjudicate rights granted by federal statutes is
undoubtedly correct. This refusal is not merely unseemly, however; it also ignores the fact
that state courts are a part of a federal system, not courts of independent sovereigns. See THE
FEDERALIST No. 82, supra note 26, at 536 (A. Hamilton). State courts are in a "partnership"
with federal courts to enforce federal law, Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare
v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 298 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring);
and unless Congress has provided otherwise for exclusive federal jurisdiction, state courts exist
to hear all claims, including federal ones. In Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 637 (1884), the
Supreme Court stated:
Upon the State courts, equally with the courts of the Union, rests the obligation to
guard, enforce, and protect every right granted or secured by the Constitution of the
United States and the laws made in pursuance thereof, whenever those rights are
involved in any suit or proceeding before them; for the judges of the State courts are
required to take an oath to support that Constitution, and they are bound by it, and
the laws of the United States made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made
under their authority, as the supreme law of the land, 'anything in the Constitution
or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.'
The general duty to enforce federal statutory rights does not place a large burden on
state courts; the overwhelming majority of such cases are undoubtedly brought in federal
court. SeeBrown v. Pitchess, 531 P.2d 772, 775, 119 Cal. Rptr. 204, 207 (1975). Pennhurstiwill
most likely lead litigants to bring federal statutory claims against state officials in state court,
thus increasing the caseload of state courts. In addition, Pennhurst implies that Exparte Young
may be limited to federal constitutional claims. See note 14 supra. Therefore, effective en-
forcement of some federal statutory rights may be available only in state court. See note 25
supra. If state courts have no duty to hear federal statutory claims, and Congress has not
explicitly overridden the state's eleventh amendment immunity, there may be no forum in
which federal statutory claims against state defendants can be redressed. Professor Sandalow
might suggest that a congressional mandate that state courts assume jurisdiction should then
be inferred. See Sandalow, supra note 47, at 207, 285. This inference is an obvious fiction and
could mean that federal statutory rights would be enforceable against state defendants in
state court, but not against municipal defendants. See note 112 in/ra. In addition, state court
is the only forum, after Pennhurst, to which plaintiffs can bring both state and federal claims
against the state or state officials acting in their official capacities.
94 The language ofother Supreme Court decisions can be read to support the proposition
that a state court is obligated to hear only those federal claims analogous to claims it does
entertain. In Mondou, the Court noted that the state court heard personal injury and death
claims, 223 U.S. at 57, claims which fell into the same category as the federal claims over
which the state court had refused to take jurisdiction. Similarly, in McKnett v. St. Louis &
S.F. Ry., 292 U.S. 230 (1934), the Court wrote that a "state may not discriminate against
rights arising under federal law." Id at 234; see also the forum non conveniens cases discussed
in note 55 supra. Both Mondou and MKnell, however, first emphasized that the state court had
general jurisdiction. Mondou, 223 U.S. at 57; McKnell, 92 U.S. at 233; see also Redish &
Muench, supra note 25, at 350-54 (arguing that case support for analogous right duty is weak).
Some commentators continue to treat as open the question whether Congress can require the
states to enforce non-analogous federally-created rights. See, e.g., Redish & Muench, supra
note 25, at 350, n. 169; Hart, The Relation Between Sate and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV.
489, at 507-08 (1954); see discussion at note 120 in/a.
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heard similar claims based on Rhode Island law.95 These interpreta-
tions of Testa, however, relying as they do entirely on certain lan-
guage in the last paragraph of opinion, cannot be the controlling
interpretations of the opinion. They ignore Testa-s chief argument
that Rhode Island's policy of judicial restraint did not excuse its
courts from hearing the federal claims. The duty of a state court not
to discriminate against federal claims is only one element of the
Court's holding.
As a practical matter, requiring state courts of general jurisdic-
tion to hear all federal claims may not be very different from requir-
ing these courts to hear all analogous federal claims. Although state
courts have interpreted Testa differently, no state court recently ana-
lyzing Testa has refused to hear federal claims when jurisdiction was
held to be concurrent.96 Testa itself did not require an exact equiva-
lence between the state claims that a state court does enforce and the
federal claims that it has a duty to enforce; the Testa Court did not
even cite similar Rhode Island cases. It referred only to a Rhode
Island case enforcing a federal double damages action-an action
that under both federal and Rhode Island law was compensatory,
not punitive-and to Rhode Island provisions creating jurisdiction.
Nor did Mondou require any precise equivalence. Although the Con-
necticut and federal laws were substantively different, the Connecti-
cut courts were obligated to hear the federal claims because the
Connecticut courts had jurisdiction to hear personal injury and
death actions. Similarly, the Court in FERCconcluded that the Mis-
sissippi commission heard analogous claims merely because the com-
mission engaged in dispute resolution.
The duty not to discriminate does, however, add one element to
the earlier conclusion that state courts of general jurisdiction cannot
refuse to hear federal claims on the basis of state policies of judicial
restraint. Under interpretations of Testa which rely entirely on the
state courts' general jurisdiction, a state could structure the jurisdic-
tion of its courts to exclude certain kinds of federal claims. This dis-
crimination would clearly be impermissible. 97 The duty not to
discriminate thus overcomes any state jurisdictional barrier, constitu-
tional or otherwise. 98 Thus, when jurisdiction is concurrent, a state
95 Testa, 330 U.S. at 394.
96 See text accompanying notes 86-89 supra.
97 See note 77 supra.
98 Teeval Co. v. Stem, 301 N.Y. 346, 93 N.E.2d 884, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 876 (1950). The
court, relying on Testa, held that the New York legislature's removal of state court jurisdiction
to hear federal rent overcharge claims was unconstitutional.
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court of general jurisdiction must hear all similar federal claims, and
state constitutional or statutory restrictions of state court jurisdiction
may not discriminate based on the substance of the federal claim or
the remedy which it provides. The parallel between state claims
heard and federal claims not heard need not be exact for unconstitu-
tional discrimination to arise. Any state restriction on its courts of
general jurisdiction resulting in failure by those state courts to adju-
dicate a federal claim would be constitutionally suspect. Once a
state establishes a court system, only a substantial restriction on the
ability of that system to hear and remedy both federal and state
claims could justify a refusal to hear and remedy a federal claim. 99
B. State Obl'ation to Establish Courts with Jurisdiction
Not only must states maintain courts with jurisdiction to hear
federal claims analogous to claims heard by the state courts, but the
states must also maintain courts with jurisdiction to hear claims that
acts of the state violated a plaintiff's federal constitutional rights
even if there already exist federal courts available to hear these
claims. The Supreme Court implied this obligation in its decision in
General Oil Co. v. Crain.100
In Crain, a Tennessee statute provided that the Tennessee courts
had no jurisdiction to entertain suits against the state, or against of-
ficers acting by authority of the state, if such suits reached state funds
or property.10 1 Plaintiff sued to enjoin the collection of a state tax on
the ground that the tax violated the commerce clause of the federal
Constitution. The state court held that it lacked jurisdiction, and the
plaintiff appealed to the United States Supreme Court. The defend-
99 Thus, under a non-discrimination analysis, if the state courts heard no claims for an
amount more than $10,000, it is not likely that these state courts would be obligated to hear
federal claims for more than that amount, assuming a federal forum was available. Cf Herb
v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945) (jurisdictional limit of city court barred suit there for federal
claim when other state courts available to hear claim). Under the same analysis, if states had
no courts that could grant equitable relief, a suit based on federal law seeking only equitable
relief apparently could not be maintained in the courts of that state, as long as a federal
forum was available. Ste also Cullison, supra note 92, at 239. But see text accompanying notes
100-22 infra.
In the text of THE FEDERALIST No. 82, Hamilton notes that, with federal jurisdiction,
the state courts would still retain their "pre-existing" jurisdiction over state claims. One com-
mentator has argued that Hamilton's reference to a state's "pre-existing"jurisdiction supports
the argument that state courts need take jurisdiction only of federal claims "analogous" to
state claims enforceable by state courts. Note, supra note 27, at 1552 n.6. This is plainly
wrong. The context of THE FEDERALIST No. 82 reveals that Hamilton stressed that Congress
could not abridge the "pre-existing" authority of the state courts, i.e., in state law matters.
100 209 U.S. 211 (1908); see Note, supra note 27, at 1556.
101 209 U.S. at 216.
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ant state official argued that the Tennessee statute provided an ade-
quate state ground justifying refusal of the Supreme Court to take
jurisdiction.10 2 The Court rejected this argument but held that the
Tennessee tax was constitutional. The Court thus impliedly held
that the Tennessee courts had a constitutional obligation 03 to hear
the constitutional challenge. To hold otherwise, the Court argued,
would in effect nullify much of the operation of constitutional provi-
sions and allow "an easy way" to avoid enforcement of those provi-
sions.10 4  As an example, the Court pointed to the eleventh
amendment prohibition against suits against a state in federal
court.'0 5 Thus, if the state refused jurisdiction over such federal con-
102 Id. at 226-27; see also Hill, supra note 25, at 1117 n.37; Sandalow, supra note 47, at 208-
09.
103 The Court did not identify that obligation or cite the supremacy clause.
104 Crain, 209 U.S. at 226-28.
105 Id. at 226. Professor Sandalow has suggested that Crain's reliance on the eleventh
amendment was misplaced because under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), decided the
same day, this amendment does not bar "suit in federal court against a state officer acting
under an allegedly unconstitutional authority." Sandalow, supra note 47, at 209 n.89. This
criticism is unwarranted. Although the eleventh amendment would not have barred the suit
for injunctive relief in Crain in federal court because of the Ex parte Young doctrine, it may
bar constitutional claims against the state itself in federal court. Thus, under the eleventh
amendment as now construed, if the plaintiff had paid the tax in Crain and then brought a
constitutional claim for a refund, his suit against the state treasury would appear to lie only in
state court. See note 25 supra; Edelman v. Jordan, 451 U.S. 651 (1974); 16 WRICHT &
MILLER, supra note 64, § 4024; HART & WECHSLER, supra note 21, at 232 (1981 Supp.).
The Supreme Court has held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 did not abrogate the states' eleventh
amendment immunity, finding no explicit intent to abrogate this immunity in the legislative
history of this Civil Rights statute. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 352 (1979); Pennhurst, 104 S. Ct.
at 907. Constitutional claims that reach a state's treasury at the present time thus cannot be
brought in federal court. In his Quem dissent, Justice Brennan argued that the majority had
held, sub silentio, that a state was not a "person" under § 1983. If a state had been a "per-
son," Justice Brennan reasoned, § 1983 would have overridden the states' eleventh amend-
ment immunity. The Supreme Court, subsequent to its holding in Monell v. Dep't of Social
Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), that a municipality is a "person" under § 1983, has yet to decide
the issue whether a state is a "person" under § 1983. State courts and lower federal courts are
divided. Compare, e.g., State v. Green, 633 P.2d 1381 (Alaska 1981); Edgar v. State, 92 Wash.
2d 217, 595 P.2d 534 (1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1077 (1980); De Bleecker v. Mont-
gomery Co., 292 Md. 498, 438 A.2d 1348 (1982); Boldt v. State, 101 Wis. 2d 566, 303 N.W.2d
133 (1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 973 (1981) (state not a "person") with Irvin v. Calhoun, 522 F.
Supp. 576 (D. Mass. 1981); Marrapese v. Rhode Island, 500 F. Supp 1207 (D.R:I. 1980);
Stanton v. Godfrey, 415 N.E.2d 103 (Ind. App. 1981); Thiboutot v. State, 405 A.2d 230 (Me.
1979), aftdsub nom. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980); Smith v. State, 122 Mich. App.
340, 333 N.W.2d 50 (1983) (all allowing § 1983 suits against state).
State courts that have explicitly or implicitly held that a state is a "person" under § 1983
have allowed federal damage claims against the state treasury which could not be brought in
federal court, because of the eleventh amendment, to be brought in state court. In Thiboutot,
the Court held that plaintiffs had stated a § 1983 claim against the state for damages in state
court, but did not examine the issue discussed here. Justice Powell, dissenting from the
Court's holding that a violation of a social security statute stated a claim under § 1983, noted
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stitutional challenges, complainants would be left without a forum in
which to bring their claims. The Court stated: "It being then the
right of a party to be protected against a law which violates a consti-
tutional right, whether by its terms or the manner of its enforcement,
it is manifest that a decision which denies such protection gives effect
to the law .... "106
The Crain approach is persuasive because it ensures that a state
forum is always available to redress federal constitutional claims as-
serted against the state, even if the eleventh amendment bars an ac-
tion in federal court. States, as responsible governmental bodies in a
federal system, may not refuse to allow their courts to hear claims
that acts of the state and state officials violated the federal Constitu-
tion. At the very least, then, the supremacy clause obligates states to
provide a judicial forum to vindicate federal constitutional claims
arising from these acts.107
Crain supports an even greater obligation of the states. It is pos-
sible that state immunity under the eleventh amendment requires
that various federal statutory claims be enforced against the state
only in state court. It is not clear at present whether the Ex parle
Young doctrine (which holds that a federal suit against state officers in
that § 1983 actions could be brought against the states. 448 U.S. at 22, n.10 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
Even if§ 1983 does not encompass claims against the state, such claims could perhaps be
directly implied under the fourteenth amendment. T & M Homes, Inc. v. Township of
Mansfield, 162 N.J. Super. 497, 393 A.2d 613 (Law Div. 1978). There is no reason to believe
that the substantive rights granted by the fourteenth amendment are limited by the sovereign
immunity doctrine of the eleventh amendment.
106 209 U.S. at 228. Professors Hart and Wechsler have suggested that Crain was over-
ruled, sub silentio, by the Supreme Court's per curiam dismissal of the appeal in Musgrove v.
Georgia R.R. & Banking Co., 335 U.S. 900 (1949). See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 21, at
935-36. In Msrgrove the Georgia Supreme Court dismissed a claim premised on the contract
clause of the federal Constitution, art. I, § 10, because the state had failed to consent to the
suit. 204 Ga. 139, 49 S.E.2d 26 (1948), appeal dismissed, 335 U.S. 900 (1949). The Supreme
Court held that this non-federal ground was adequate to support the Georgia court's decision.
See also Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299 (1952). To the extent Crain
was overruled by this per curiam dismissal, it has been resuscitated by recent Supreme Court
assertions that sovereign immunity defenses to federal claims are issues of federal, not state,
law. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 647 n.30 (1980); Martinez v. California,
444 U.S. 277, 284 n.8 (1980). Martinez is particularly on point because in that case state
sovereign immunity was stated to be no defense to federal claims brought in state court. See
also T & M Homes, Inc. v. Township of Mansfield, 162 N.J. Super. 497, 503, 393 A.2d 613,
618 (Law Div. 1978).
107 See also Normand v. Barkei, 385 Mass. 851, 851 n.1, 434 N.E.2d 631, 633 n.1 (1982). As
stated, see note 25 supra, it would appear that Congress could limit federal constitutional
claims to federal court, if these courts had authority to provide adequate remedies for the
constitutional violations. The Crain Court did not consider this issue.
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their individual capacities is not a suit against the state) 08 extends to
federal statutory actions.'0 9 Moreover, federal courts cannot award
damages against a state treasury without that state's consent, unless
Congress has overridden the state's eleventh amendment immu-
nity. 1 10 Thus, states should be required to maintain courts which can
hear federal claims challenging acts of states and state officers to en-
sure that there is always a forum in which to vindicate federal
rights."' It would further appear that states must provide courts to
review constitutional claims arising from the acts of local, county,
and municipal officials.' 12
Indeed, Crain's concern that there always be a judicial forum to
enforce federal rights and its suggestion that constitutional analysis
must take account of "the possibility of extremes""13 argues for a
state court obligation to hear all federal claims when jurisdiction is
concurrent. '4 Congress' ability to limit the jurisdiction of the infer-
108 Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
109 See note 14 supra.
110 See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
111 Professor Hill suggests that it was significant that the jurisdictional provision in Crain
removed jurisdiction that the state court otherwise had, and thus the invalidation of the ap-
plication of this provision restores general jurisdiction as vested by other provisions. Hill,
supra note 25, at 1117 n.37. He quotes Kenney v. Supreme Lodge, 252 U.S. 411, 415 (1920),
in which Justice Holmes wrote that Crain "foreshadowed the rule that 'a State cannot escape
its constitutional obligations by the simple device of denying jurisdiction in such cases to
courts otherwise competent.' "
Because all states have court systems of general jurisdiction, see note 76 supra, it is perhaps
unnecessary to decide whether the obligations which Crain appears to impose depend upon
the existence of general jurisdiction in the state courts. The Crain Court never inquired
whether the Tennessee courts had general jurisdiction. More important, the existence vel non
of general jurisdictional statutes was not relevant to the Crain Court's central concern that a
forum be available to vindicate federal constitutional rights. Crain requires the states to pro-
vide judicial forums for these claims without regard to the pre-existing jurisdiction of the state
courts, or indeed the existence of any courts. But see Kenney, 252 U.S. at 414 ("[T]here is truth
in the proposition that the Constitution does not require the State to furnish a court.") (full
faith and credit case).
112 Although the Supreme Court has held that the eleventh amendment does not gener-
ally apply to counties and similar municipal corporations, Mt. Healthy City School Dist. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977), to the extent these units of local government act in conjunc-
tion with the state, they may effectively share the state's eleventh amendment immunity.
Pennhurst, 104 S. Ct. at 920-21. In addition, for the reasons stated in the text, it is proper to
obligate states to maintain courts to hear all federal constitutional challenges to state action.
113 Crain, 209 U.S. at 226-27.
114 This obligation includes the obligation to hear federal claims brought against federal
officers or agencies. Of course, federal officers or agencies can remove lawsuits brought
against them in state court to federal court. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441-1442. In Tarble's Case, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (187 1), the Supreme Court held that a state court did not have the power
to issue a writ of habeas corpus for the discharge of a person in federal custody allegedly in
violation of federal law, or even to determine whether the federal tribunal which tried the
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ior federal courts would, under the Grain analysis, also support this
obligation. 15
Testa can also be interpreted broadly to require states to redress
all federal rights when jurisdiction is concurrent. The Testa Court
suggested as much when it stated that "the obligation of states to
enforce these federal laws is not lessened by reason of the form in
which they are cast or the remedy which they provide."' 16 This
statement suggests that the states are responsible for enforcing federal
law regardless of the jurisdiction of their courts. In addition, the
broad language of Testa stating that federal policy is the prevailing
policy of every state suggests that states must have courts to enforce
that federal policy.117
A state court obligation to address federal claims guarantees a
judicial forum for the presentation of federal rights even if Congress
abolishes the inferior federal courts altogether or restricts their juris-
diction."" Some might argue that this obligation need arise only if
underlying lawsuit had jurisdiction to do so. Tarble's Case should be read to rest upon an
implied congressional intent that habeas actions to release enlisted soldiers from the military
be restricted to federal court. Tarble's Case, under this interpretation, is no more than an
instance in which Congress has vested exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts. Tarble's
Case might also be an example of a "disabling incompatibility between the federal claim and
state court adjudication." Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 477-78 (1981);
see also text accompanying note 25 supra.
115 Professor Sandalow suggests that Congress' power to restrict federal court jurisdiction
is a more plausible basis for Grain than the eleventh amendment, but he then questions
whether it is appropriate to fashion state court constitutional obligations upon the remote
possibility that Congress will restrict federal court jurisdiction. Sandalow, spra note 47, at
209. He would have any failure of Congress to confer jurisdiction upon the federal courts for
federal constitutional claims be interpreted as a direction by Congress that state courts must
assume jurisdiction. Id. As has already been established, Sandalow's argument suffers be-
cause it fails to take into account that the eleventh amendment may require that certain
constitutional claims be brought in state court. See note 105 supra. There are several other
objections to his proposal. First, the possibility that Congress will restrict the federal constitu-
tional jurisdiction of the federal courts no longer seems "remote," as it may have appeared in
1965. See note 21 supra. The statement in Grain that constitutional analysis must take account
of the possibility of extremes is thus well heeded. Second, state courts have an equal responsi-
bility with federal courts to enforce federal rights, see note 93 supra, and it is particularly
appropriate for states to maintain courts to test the propriety of state action under the federal
Constitution as well as under other laws. See text accompanying notes 14-19 supra. Third,
any implied congressional intent that state courts must assume jurisdiction could be overcome
by explicit congressional intent that state courts and federal courts be deprived ofjurisdiction.
The congressional restrictions on state jurisdiction in these circumstances would be unconsti-
tutional, and state courts would be obligated to hear the federal constitutional claims, but
there would be no implicit congressional intent that the state courts assume jurisdiction. See
note 25 supra see also Hart, supra note 29, at 360.
116 Testa, 330 U.S. at 341.
117 Id. at 393.
118 Professor Tribe in his treatise interprets the Hart Dialogue to speak only to the re-
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Congress actually abolishes the inferior federal courts; t 19 but as
stated in Crain, constitutional obligations are based on the possibility
(not the existence) of extremes.1 20 The obligation to vindicate all fed-
eral rights is also supported by the fact that there was no general
federal question jurisdiction at all in federal court before 1875.121
Congress only recently struck the requirement of a minimum amount
in controversy from 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the statute which provides for
federal question jurisdiction.1 22 Certainly, the broad language of the
supremacy clause, which specifically binds state judges without re-
gard to provisions of state law, supports a requirement that states
maintain courts to hear all federal questions.
In any event, the Supreme Court has not clearly established that
states must provide courts to hear all federal claims when jurisdiction
is concurrent. Although Testa may hint at this requirement, its hold-
ing is far more limited. Thus, for purposes of the analysis below, this
article assumes that states are not obligated to hear federal claims if a
federal court is available to provide a complete remedy, the state
constitution and statutes do not empower the state courts to hear the
quirement of a state court to enforce federal rights when it enforces similar state rights. L.
TRIBE, supra note 47, at 38. This interpretation ignores the reading of Testa suggested by
Professor Hart, see Hart, supra note 29, at 330, and his central concern that there always be an
adjudicative forum to vindicate federal rights.
119 Hart, supra note 94, at 507.
If the broad reading of Crain is correct, and state courts have an independent responsibil-
ity to enforce federal law because of the "possibility of extremes," then Grain goes further than
this analysis advanced by Professor Hart. Cf Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932) (due
process does not allow Congress to withdraw review by article III courts of constitutionality of
administrative findings).
120 209 U.S. at 226-27. If the analysis suggested in this article is correct, see text accompa-
nying notes 29-30 supra, it follows that were Congress in fact to abolish the inferior federal
courts, states would be required to have courts to vindicate all federal rights. See Gulf Off-
shore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478 n.4 (1981). Similarly, if Congress restricted
the jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts, state courts would be obligated to have courts to
vindicate all federal rights that could not be asserted in federal court. In either instance, the
existence of state court jurisdiction over similar claims would be irrelevant. Accordingly, the
ability of Congress to eliminate or restrict the jurisdiction of federal courts under article III,
and the obligation which the supremacy clause places on the states, state officials, and partic-
ularly state judges, demonstrates that Congress has the power to obligate states to have courts
to adjudicate all federal claims. There is no reason that this power of Congress should be
contingent upon Congress actually limiting federal court jurisdiction. If Congress has the
authority to obligate state courts to adjudicate unfamiliar claims when no federal court is
available, it would appear to have the same authority even if a federal court were available.
Congress need not strip federal courts of jurisdiction in order to force state courts to under-
take unfamiliar functions. See also Hart, supra note 94, at 507.
121 Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 401-02 (1973); HART & WECHSLER, supra
note 21, at 39.
122 The minimum amount in controversy requirement was removed from § 1331 in 1980.
Pub. L. No. 96-486, 94 Stat. 2369 (1980).
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federal claim or any similar claim, and the federal claim does not
challenge the propriety of state action.
Analysis of a state court's obligation to hear justiciable federal
claims depends on three principles drawn from Testa and related
cases. First, a state court of general jurisdiction can not refuse to
hear a federal claim on the basis of a state doctrine of judicial re-
straint. Second, states cannot structure the jurisdiction of their
courts to discriminate against federal claims. Discrimination may ex-
ist even where the analogy between state claims heard and federal
claims not heard is not exact. Third, a state must maintain courts to
hear claims that actions of the state and state officials violated the
federal Constitution, and perhaps to hear claims that any state ac-
tion violated federal law.
III. State Court Obligation to Hear Justiciable Federal Claims
Even if a state establishes courts with jurisdiction to hear federal
claims, those state courts may declare federal claims which are justi-
ciable under federal law to be non-justiciable in state court and thus
decline to hear the federal claims. As stated above,1 23 state courts
hold claims to be non-justiciable for three major reasons: (1) the is-
sue is textually committed to another branch; (2) judicial inquiry will
unduly interfere with the operation of the other branches; and (3) the
court is not equipped to determine the issue or to provide remedies.
These elements of justiciability are considered separately in analyz-
ing state courts' obligation to hear federal claims which are justicia-
ble under federal law. It is rare, however, that only one element will
be at issue in any given case.
A. Textual Commitment
Although all states have court systems with general jurisdiction,
state constitutional or statutory provisions may commit particular is-
sues to other branches of state government. If such a provision un-
equivocally reserves the issue to another branch, the state court is
stripped of its jurisdiction over that issue. Assuming that the federal
claim does not challenge state action, the state court is absolved from
deciding the federal question, unless the jurisdiction-stripping provi-
sion discriminates against the federal claim. It should be noted, how-
ever, that textual provisions of constitutions and statutes are seldom
unequivocal, and the history of their passage may offer no decisive
123 See text accompanying notes 34-36 supra.
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guidance. A state court interpreting a provision possibly reserving an
issue to another branch must take into account that federal policy is
paramount: under Testa, the federal policy of redressing federal
rights overcomes a state judicial policy of not hearing the claims.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered this issue of jus-
ticiability in Sweeney v. Tucker.124 The Pennsylvania House of Repre-
sentatives had expelled the appellant from membership, and he
sought reinstatement and back pay,1 25 asserting that the House had
deprived him of his federal constitutional rights. After rejecting ap-
pellees' argument that the speech or debate clause of the Penn-
sylvania Constitution barred the suit, 26 the court considered
whether the Pennsylvania Constitution exclusively committed mat-
ters concerning expulsion of a member to the Pennsylvania House of
Representatives. The court noted that it could infer that the matter
was committed to the House, 2 7 but chose not to do so for three rea-
sons. The court had the institutional competence to determine the
procedural due process issues raised; 28 the court had heard similar
challenges to legislative procedures; 2 9 and the court recognized the
crucial role state courts play in enforcing federal constitutional
rights. 130 It stated that the Pennsylvania Constitution should be con-
strued, when possible, to permit state court review of federal claims
arising from actions of the political branches of state government
when those claims are cognizable in federal court.' 3'
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled, in effect, that there was
a "false conflict" between federal and state standards of justiciability
and thus avoided the question whether the state constitutional provi-
sion could bar the justiciable federal constitutional claim. The court
gave persuasive reasons for taking jurisdiction of justiciable federal
124 473 Pa. 493, 375 A.2d 698 (1977).
125 Appellant sought both to enjoin the special election called to fill his seat and to obtain
a declaratory judgment declaring the proposed election void. Id. at 493-94, 375 A.2d at 698.
126 Id. at 504-07, 375 A.2d at 703-04. The court, although it sought guidance from federal
cases, treated this issue purely as one of state law. It did not consider the implications if the
clause did bar the federal constitutional claims which were certainly justiciable under federal
law. See Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966). The existence of a state legislative immunity
defense to a federal claim is an issue of federal law. See note 106 supra.
127 473 Pa. at 517-18, 375 A.2d at 709-10.
128 Id. at 517-18, 375 A.2d at 709-10. The court also wrote that the political question
doctrine was disfavored when individual rights were at stake.
129 Id. at 518, 375 A.2d at 710.
130 Id. at 519-22, 375 A.2d at 710-12.
131 Id. at 522, 375 A.2d at 712; cf. Vickers v. Home Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 87 Misc. 2d
880, 386 N.Y.S.2d 291 (Monroe County Sup. Ct. 1976) (when remedying federal claims, state
court interprets state statute providing for class actions to allow class action that the court
held was required by federal law).
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claims whenever possible. It noted that state court resolution of
questions concerning the functioning of state government is prefera-
ble, that state court expertise in state law might enhance the quality
of constitutional adjudication, and that federal court intervention in
state affairs might be more intrusive than state court intervention. 132
Although it referred to the state courts' "parallel responsibility
to enforce federal constitutional rights,"'33 Sweene also suggested
that the Pennsylvania Constitution could preclude all state court re-
view of issues-including federal constitutional issues-arising from
the legislative expulsion without offending the federal Constitu-
tion.13 4 This view fails to take into account the state courts' duty
under Crain to hear justiciable federal constitutional claims challeng-
ing state action. Indeed, the Sweene court failed to cite Crain.135
In addition, the Sweene court did not recognize that it would be
unconstitutionally discriminating against the federal claims raised if
it refused to hear those claims. The court acknowledged that it heard
federal due process claims and similar challenges to legislative proce-
dure. Because it heard these analogous claims, the court was obli-
gated to adjudicate appellant's federal due process claim on the
merits.13 6
132 473 Pa. at 521-22, 375 A.2d at 711-12.
133 Id. at 522, 375 A.2d at 712.
134 Id. at 520 n.28, 375 A.2d at 711. But see State v. Banks, 454 S.W.2d 498 (Mo. 1970),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 991 (1971).
135 If the appellant in Sweeny had a constitutional right to back pay, he could recover that
money against the state only in state court. The eleventh amendment would have barred the
award of damages for back pay in federal court. The Missouri Supreme Court, in State v.
Banks, 454 S.W.2d 498, 501 (Mo. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 991 (1971), faced a similar issue
concerning a state court's obligation to address federal constitutional issues regarding the
ouster of a state legislator. The court held, with little explanation, that the Missouri Constitu-
tion barred plaintiffs' claims based on state law, but that, notwithstanding, it had an obliga-
tion to hear the parallel federal claims. Banks does demonstrate that the main practical goal
proposed by this article-that if a state court is obligated to hear justiciable federal claims, it
will also hear similar state claims-will not always be achieved. But this practical objective is
more likely to be achieved when a state constitutional provision does not commit the issue to
another branch.
136 Similar issues arose in state court cases after Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), in
which the apportionment of state legislative districts was alleged to violate the federal Consti-
tution. A badly divided Michigan Supreme Court held that a "one-man, one-vote" challenge
to the districting of the Michigan legislature was not justiciable, apparently relying on federal
law. Scholle v. Hare, 360 Mich. 1, 104 N.W.2d 63 (1960), vacated and remanded, 369 U.S. 429
(1962). The Supreme Court vacated this decision in light of Baker, and on remand all mem-
bers of the still extremely divided Michigan Supreme Court assumed that the challenge was
justiciable. Scholle v. Hare, 367 Mich. 176, 116 N.W.2d 350 (1962), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 990
(1964); see also 367 Mich. at 196, 116 N.W.2d at 359 (Carr, C.J., dissenting) (vacatur by the
Supreme Court means only that the challenge is justiciable). In Maryland Comm. for Fair
Representation v. Tawes, 228 Md. 412, 180 A.2d 656 (1962), afJd, 229 Md. 406, 184 A.2d 715,
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B. Interference with Another Branch
A state court may refuse to adjudicate a claim because to do so
would interfere with the operation of other branches of state govern-
ment. 37 The court may have the power to hear the claim under the
state constitution, but may nonetheless choose to abstain because of a
judge-made policy against undue interference. Such a judicial policy
cannot justify a state court's refusal to hear justiciable federal claims.
The paramount federal policy that certain state legislative or execu-
tive action be subject to review supplants any contrary state judicial
policy under which such action may not be reviewed. The justiciable
federal claims themselves mandate this "interference." 138
A state court's refusal to hear federal claims which are justicia-
ble under federal law does not, of course, bar federal court review,
which, as stated in Sweeney, is likely to be more intrusive than state
court review.1 39 A state court's refusual to hear federal claims, then,
amounts to a de facto abdication to the federal courts to address the
claims. The result of this refusal is therefore not that the activities of
other branches are immune from judicial review, but that a state
court, as distinguished from a federal court, does not undertake this
review.
C. State Court Competence
The strongest argument for state court abstention from hearing
a justiciable federal claim is that constitutional or statutory provi-
sions do not empower the court to hear the claim. But all states have
court systems of general jurisdiction, and rarely do state constitutions
and statutes explicitly or implicitly bar state courts from hearing par-
ticular claims.14° Claims are more commonly barred by state court
precedent precluding the state court from addressing the federal
claims and from granting appropriate remedies because of the nar-
rower role of state courts in state government. Requiring the state
rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 377 U.S. 656 (1964) (applauding the willingness of the state
court to assume jurisdiction), the court stated that Baker seemed to require it to hold an
apportionment claim to be justiciable, particularly in light of the Supreme Court's vacatur in
Scholle. Tawes, 228 Md. at 427, 180 A.2d at 664. Because Maryland had courts of general
jurisdiction and because there was no jurisdictional barrier preventing these courts from hear-
ing the apportionment challenge, the court held that the Maryland courts were obligated to
hear this challenge.
137 Jones v. Beame, 45 N.Y.2d 402, 380 N.E.2d 277, 408 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1978).
138 New Jersey-Philadelphia Presbytery v. New Jersey State Bd. of Higher Educ., 654
F.2d 868, 883 (3d Cir. 1981).
139 Sween, 473 Pa. at 521-22, 375 A.2d at 711-12.
140 See note 76 supra. But see notes 77 and 126-27 supra.
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court to address the federal claims would thus impose functions on
that court in contravention of policies of judicial restraint.14 1
The argument that state court precedents concerning jus-
ticiability can excuse a state court from redressing a federal claim has
some superficial appeal. A state court's definition of its judicial role
should arguably be given the same respect as state jurisdiction-grant-
ing provisions. Under this view, state court jurisdiction is not ade-
quate and appropriate when state policies of judicial restraint would
bar the federal claim.
This argument invites two major objections. First, a policy of
judicial restraint-that is, one not mandated by a state constitutional
or statutory provision-results in a court's failure to use the full pow-
ers available under its jurisdictional provisions. It does not evidence
a lack of power or competence to hear these federal claims. As Testa
makes clear, however, state judicial policy must bow before the fed-
eral policy that state courts vindicate federal rights. Under Testa,
adequate and appropriate state jurisdiction depends upon jurisdic-
tional provisions, not judicially-created policies. The supremacy
clause requires that state courts use all their available jurisdiction to
hear federal claims.
Second, hearing justiciable federal claims is unlikely as a practi-
cal matter to require the state courts to take on a wholly unfamiliar
role, even when those state courts subscribe to a restrictive view of
justiciability. State courts are not very different from federal courts,
and federal standards should adequately protect the state courts
from assuming an improper judicial role. A justiciable federal claim
must be a "case or controversy" under the Constitution, as well as
justiciable under federal law. State courts can identify the issues and
determine liability under federal law with the guidance of federal
standards.' 42 A state court of general jurisdiction is as competent as
a federal court to interpret federal law and to conduct a trial. 43
At most, a state court can argue that it is not equipped to rem-
edy the federal rights-for instance, that it cannot oversee the opera-
tion of a jail, a school system, or an institution for the mentally ill. A
141 At the Appellate Division argument in Joanne S. v. Carey, 94 A.D.2d 691, 462
N.Y.S.2d 808 (lst Dep't 1983), discussed in note 12 s.upra, one of the justices remarked that
federal courts might well grant the kind of relief requested against the defendant state offi-
cials, but that New York courts would not. This remark indicated a limited view of the role
of New York courts, not that the operations of the other two branches of state government,
challenged in Joanne S., should be entirely free from judicial review.
142 Sweeng, 473 Pa. at 519, 375 A.2d at 710.
143 But see Zorick v. Tynes, 372 So. 2d 133 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
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state court might contend that the federal courts have assumed a
non-traditional judicial role in reforming institutions, a role which
state courts will not assume. But state courts with common law and
equitable powers invariably have the power to grant effective relief
and cannot ignore the federal policy that substantive federal rights
be vindicated. The supremacy clause does not allow state courts to
close their doors to federal claims because of a distaste for federal
policy. The difficulty of providing a remedy for justiciable federal
claims cannot of itself excuse a state court from refusing even to hear
those claims.
IV. State Court Obligation to Apply Federal Remedies
As discussed above, state courts must exercise their jurisdiction
to the fullest extent in order to hear federal claims. Similarly, they
must exercise their full statutory and constitutional powers to grant
effective remedies for these claims. Testa teaches that, if federal law
requires that a precise remedy be provided, a state court must pro-
vide that same remedy (if the court has the statutory and constitu-
tional power under state law to provide that or an analogous
remedy.)44 Moreover, for constitutional claims brought against the
state and state officials-and probably all claims challenging state
action-state courts must grant the remedy which federal law re-
quires, without regard to the court's power under the state constitu-
tion or statutes.
A. The Necessity of Providing an Effective Remedy
All states have court systems of general jurisdiction and wide
144 Cases following Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), have addressed the
extent to which federal courts are required to enforce state remedies in diversity cases. Under
these cases, the federal courts are generally required to follow state law, but they are not
required to grant relief inconsistent with federal law. See, e.g., Butner v. United States, 440
U.S. 48 (1979); American Dredging Co. v. Local 25, Marine Div., Int'l Union of Operating
Eng'rs, 338 F.2d 837 (3d Cir. 1964), cerl. denied, 380 U.S. 935 (1965) (injunctive relief denied
on basis of Norris-LaGuardia Act restraints on federal courts despite state court availability of
such relief in labor dispute). Federal courts can also adopt some federal remedial procedures
even when those procedures would not be available in state court. See, e.g., American Brands
v. Playgirl, 498 F.2d 947 (2d Cir. 1974) (standard for injunctive relief determined by federal
law). The general rule that courts should apply state remedies in diversity cases discourages
forum shopping and minimizes discrimination between state-court and federal-court litigants.
See generally 19 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & L. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 4513 (1982). The duty of state courts to enforce federal remedies arises, of course, from the
supremacy clause. Considerations such as forum shopping and uniform treatment of state
and federal litigants would be additional support for the application of federal remedies to
vindicate federal rights in converse-Erie situations. See note 157 infra.
[1984]
JUSTICIABILITY
remedial powers. These courts are therefore generally equipped to
provide most remedies that federal courts would employ to vindicate
federal rights. 145 It has long been clear that state courts must employ
effective remedies within their general remedial powers to vindicate
federal rights. In Iowa-Des Moines National Bank v. Bennett,'46 petition-
ers sought a refund, claiming that the state had imposed a tax on
them in a discriminatory manner, in violation of the due process and
equal protection clauses of the federal Constitution. The state court
held that petitioners' remedy was to bring an action to compel tax
collection from the favored class of taxpayers or to await such action
by state authorities. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that peti-
tioners were entitled to the refund and could not be required to as-
sume the burden of seeking an increase in taxes for the favored class
or await action by state officials to do so.14 7 The remedy proposed by
the state court was not adequate to protect the federal right at stake,
and the state court had the jurisdiction to afford the effective
remedy.
In Ward v. Board of County Commissioners,'14 plaintiffs, Choctaw In-
dians, sought to recover taxes they claimed had been coercively col-
lected. Plaintiffs asserted they were not obligated to pay the taxes in
question because of an exemption under federal law. They main-
tained that the tax exemption was a vested property right which the
county had abrogated in violation "of a right arising out of a law of
145 The issue of what constitutes a proper remedy for a federal claim is an issue of federal
law. See Dice v. Akron, C. & Y.R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 361 (1952) (validity of releases under
FELA is federal question to be determined by federal, not state, law); see also, e.g., Miller v.
Apartments & Homes of New Jersey, Inc., 646 F.2d 101 (3d Cir. 1981) (federal law deter-
mines contribution under civil rights laws); Carter v. Romines, 560 F.2d 395 (8th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 948 (1978) (standing to sue under civil rights law determined under
federal law); Boscarino v. Nelson, 518 F.2d 879, 882 n.3 (7th Cir. 1975) (state law not control-
ling on question of good faith defense in a § 1983 action); Felder v. Foster, 107 Misc. 2d 782,
784, 436 N.Y.S.2d 675, 677 (Monroe County Sup. Ct. 1981) (holding that court had jurisdic-
tion over § 1983 claim and that "where. . . an action is based solely upon Federal statute, it
must be determined in accordance with Federal law. .
146 284 U.S. 239 (1931).
147 Id. at 247. Before the decision in Bennett, inadequacy of a legal remedy in state court
was described by then Professor Frankfurter to serve as "the basis of equitable intervention by
the federal courts." See Frankfurter, Distribution ofJudicial Power Between United Slates and State
Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 517 (1928), stating that the federal courts were "compelled to
entertain jurisdiction in these suits because the states do not provide adequate legal remedies
through their own courts," (citing, inter alia, Proctor & Gamble Distrib. Co. v. Sherman, 2
F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1924) (failure of state law to provide for recovery of interest on taxes uncon-
stitutionally levied); Chicago Great W. Ry. v. Kendall, 266 U.S. 94 (1924) (burden of possi-
bility of multiple lawsuits under questionable statute); Exparle Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)
(threat of oppressive penalties for disobedience of challenged order of a state commission)).
148 253 U.S. 17 (1920).
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Congress and protected by the Constitution of the United States and
that the county was accordingly bound to repay the moneys thus
collected."' 149 The Supreme Court of Oklahoma held, first, that the
taxes could not be recovered because they had been paid voluntarily
and, second, that the county could not be liable for taxes it had in
turn paid over to the state.' 50
The United States Supreme Court rejected the county's argu-
ment that independent non-federal grounds were broad enough to
sustain the judgment of the Oklahoma Court to deprive the United
States Supreme Court of jurisdiction. The Court held, first, that
there was no fair and substantial support for the state court holding
that plaintiffs had paid the tax voluntarily.' 51 More pertinent here,
the Court rejected the county's argument that its payment of the col-
lected taxes over to the state could justify the county's refusal to re-
imburse plaintiffs. An effective remedy to protect plaintiffs' federal
statutory and constitutional rights required that the county be liable
for any taxes coercively collected. Otherwise, the Court stated, the
county "could take or appropriate the property of these Indian allot-
tees arbitrarily and without due process of law."'' 52
Bennett and Ward demonstrate that state judicial policies that
leave plaintiffs without effective remedies in state court must yield to
the federal policy that effective remedies be granted to protect fed-
eral rights. 5 3 The resulting state court obligation to grant an effec-
tive remedy does not generally cause any jurisdictional problems for
state courts, because the general jurisdiction of state courts of juris-
diction will be, in almost all instances, "adequate and appropriate
under local law"' 5 4 to grant an effective remedy.
149 Id. at 20.
150 Id. at 21.
151 Id. at 22-24.
152 Id. at 24.
153 Hill, supra note 25, at 1115 n.29; see also Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Say. Co. v. Hill, 281
U.S. 673 (1930), involving a state court's denial of injunctive relief to a plaintiff who chal-
lenged the constitutionality of a certain tax imposed by the county of Henry in Missouri. The
state court based its refusal to grant relief on the ground that the plaintiff was guilty of laches
in not pursuing an administrative remedy which a previous state court decision had ruled was
not available. Id. at 675-76. Citing Mondou v. New York, 223 U.S. 1, 55-57 (1912), the
Supreme Court held that injunctive relief was appropriate-and, impliedly, mandated-and
that the state court decision had violated plaintiff's due process rights by failing to grant a
remedy to plaintiff based upon the exclusivity of an administrative remedy which the state
court had previously declared to be unavailable. 281 U.S. at 678.
Justice Brandeis, writing for the Court, held that "a State may not deprive a person of all
existing remedies for the enforcement of a right . . . unless there is, or was, afforded to him
some real opportunity to protect it." Id. at 682.
154 Testa, 330 U.S. at 394.
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B. State Court Discretion to Choose the Appropriate Remed
State courts applying federal remedies clearly have the same
freedom to exercise discretion in the application of those remedies as
federal courts have. For example, federal law may not require a par-
ticular remedy for federal violations in institutional reform cases. In-
stead, the case law will reveal a multitude of discretionary federal
remedies, ranging from the least intrusive remedy of a declaratory
judgment to the most intrusive remedy of administration of the state
institution by a federal master.' 55 Although a federal court may be
inclined to appoint a master, federal law will probably not require
such an appointment. A state court is then free to choose a less intru-
sive remedy for enforcing the federal rights, as long as the remedy it
chooses is effective. If the less intrusive remedy proves ineffective to
correct the federal wrongs, then the state must choose a more intru-
sive remedy.' 56
If federal law provides a precise remedy for a federal claim, a
state court must provide the same remedy to the extent that it has
the power to do so. t -9 Thus, in Testa, the state court was required to
award a treble damage remedy even when it might not otherwise
have done so. 158 There had been no showing that Rhode Island pro-
vided treble damages in any state cases, but this did not seem of par-
ticular importance to the Court. What was important was that the
state court had adequate and appropriate jurisdiction to hear the
federal claims. The federal policy that state courts enforce those ac-
tions overcame the state policy against awarding the treble damages.
It is likewise well settled that state courts must enforce certain
155 See generally Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV.
1133, 1247-50 (1977).
156 C, e.g., Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 673 F.2d 647 (3d Cir. 1982),
rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984), in which Judge Garth, in dissent, suggested that before a master
was appointed to oversee an institution for the mentally retarded, the state should be given
the opportunity "to propose a plan for achieving compliance." 673 F.2d at 665. Judge Garth
suggested that, if injunctive relief proved inadequate, plaintiffs could return to the courts for
further relief. Id. at 671.
157 Congress would always have the power, of course, to mandate specifically that the
state courts enforce a particular remedy. See note 120 supra. This requirement that state
courts grant the precise remedy prescribed by federal law promotes uniformity of result in
federal actions brought in state court. See, e.g., Dice v. Akron, C. & Y.R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 361
(1952) ("[O]nly if federal law controls can the [FELA] be given that uniform application
throughout the country essential to effectuate its purposes."); Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S.
301, 307 (1964). But f McCarroll v. Los Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 315
P.2d 322, 332 (Cal. 1957) ("uniformity in the determination of the substantive federal right
. . . is not threatened because a state court . . . give[s] a more complete and effective
remedy").
158 See 330 U.S. at 391.
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constitutionally-mandated remedies even in the face of contrary state
policy. One such remedy is the exclusionary rule. About half the
states in the Union did not apply an exclusionary rule at the time the
Supreme Court mandated its application by the states in Mapp v.
Ohio. 15 9 The Court in Mapp required the state courts to enforce the
exclusionary rule because it was the only effective remedy for the
harm caused by illegally obtained evidence. 160 The Mapp rule, of
course, intrudes on what had formerly been a state's prerogative to
enforce its own rules of evidence. 16 1
Remedies demanded by federal law may be more burdensome
for a state court to enforce than the exclusion of evidence. Neverthe-
less, a state court must grant these remedies if it has the power to do
so or to grant analogous remedies. For example, the Supreme Court
has held that busing is an appropriate remedy to correct racial im-
balance in the schools caused by segregation 62 and that federal
159 367 U.S. 643, 651 (1961). The Supreme Court had previously ruled the exclusionary
rule applicable to the federal courts as a "judicially created rule of evidence" and not a consti-
tutional "command." See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 39-40 (1949) (Black, J., concurring);McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340-41 (1943). See generally Hill, The BillofRights and
the Superusoq Power, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 181, 182-85 (1969).
160 367 U.S. at 652-53. Mapp rejected the finding of Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949),
that states that had not adopted the exclusionary rule were no less successful in enforcing the
rule against unreasonable searches and seizures than the federal system, which relied on the
exclusionary rule.
161 This intrusion, even if unwelcome in the state courts, nonetheless requires no unusual
exercise of powers. Every state has rules of evidence; Mapp merely requires the states to apply
a particular rule of evidence in certain situations. Similarly, when the Supreme Court held in
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), that the federal Constitution requires reversal of
a criminal conviction in state court where the defendant was not represented by counsel, no
unusual exercise of state judicial power was required. In the absence of the Supreme Court's
decision, of course, a state would not necessarily reverse the convictions covered by Gideon, but
reversal of a conviction is well within the everyday arsenal of state court remedies.
162 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
Federal habeas actions also present a difficult problem for the state courts. Under article
I, § 9, "[tlhe Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended." Although this
provision may be read simply to prohibit Congress from interfering with state habeas corpus
proceedings, see generaly Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REv.
1038, 1267 (1970), it has been read to provide for a federal constitutional right of habeas
corpus. See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 405-09 (1963) (discussing historical basis for fed-
eral habeas). In any event, federal habeas has a statutory basis, now codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 (1982). And it would appear that this federal remedy, like other "effective remedies,"
must be available to litigants in some court if the federal forum is unavailable. Cf Develop-
ments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, supra, at 1267, 1271-73 (suggesting that Congress must
provide a federal forum to serve the purposes of "modern habeas"). Were Congress to abolish
federal courts, or to repeal 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the question would arise whether state courts
must grant relief equivalent to federal habeas in the absence of the federal forum. It would
seem that state courts must enforce federal habeas rights (or provide analogous relie) in the
absence of a federal forum to vindicate those rights. The Supreme Court has intimated that
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courts have authority, through their equitable powers, to grant this
kind of relief.1 63 Although the Court has not explicitly held busing to
be a constitutionally-mandated remedy, it has stated that "it is un-
likely that a truly effective remedy [for unconstitutional school segre-
gation] could be developed without continued reliance upon it."164
Indeed, the Court has held that state anti-busing laws contravene the
Court's direction that "all reasonable methods be available to formu-
late an effective remedy."16 5
Thus, in some instances the fourteenth amendment appears to
require busing to remedy school segregation. Obviously, a state
court which uses busing as a remedy for violations of state law must
use busing to remedy school segregation under federal law. 166 In ad-
dition, if federal law mandates a specific remedy, like busing, a court
must interpret its jurisdictional powers expansively to provide that
remedy.' 67 Finally, a state court with general equitable powers is ob-
state courts must be available to entertain federal habeas claims if the state affords no post-
conviction remedies under its own law. See, e.g., Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336 (1965);
Young v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235, 238 (1949). But cf. Woods v. Nierstheimer, 328 U.S. 211, 217
(1946); Hart, supra note 94, at 507 n.59 (both suggesting that if the state courts are unavaila-
ble to vindicate post-conviction constitutional rights, the federal courts would be available to
correct such wrongs). See Note, Proposed Modiftation of Federal Habeas Corpusfor State Prisoners-
Reform or Revocation?, 61 GEo. LJ. 1221, 1236 (1973); cf. Sandalow, supra note 47, at 213
(unresolved question whether states have obligation to provide post-conviction relief for pro-
tection of fourteenth amendment rights if Congress limits availability of federal habeas). Of
course, Congress can require that federal habeas be granted exclusively by the federal courts.
See note 114 supra.
163 433 U.S. 406, 410 (1976); id. at 421 (Brennan, J., concurring); Keyes v. School Dist.
No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
164 North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 46 (1971).
165 Id. at 46 (citing Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968)).
166 California has employed busing as a remedy for state constitutional violations in cir-
cumstances in which it was questionable whether the federal Constitution would have re-
quired busing. See, e.g., Bustop, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 439 U.S. 1380, 1384 (1978)
(Rehnquist, J., Circuit Justice).
167 In Vickers v. Home Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 87 Misc. 2d 880, 386 N.Y.S.2d 291
(Monroe County Sup. Ct. 1976), the court permitted a class action to proceed under the
federal Truth-in-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1650, by interpreting the New York class
action provisions to allow such suits in these instances. The court apparently believed that
class relief was part of the substantive right, and that to hold that state statutory provisions
"barr[ed] such actions in the courts of this state because of a failure to find specific authority
under [the Truth-in-Lending Act] would appear to be unconstitutional." Id at 885-86, 386
N.Y.S.2d at 296.
It might appear that state courts, which are not required to follow federal procedures,
need not adhere to federal class action standards when enforcing federal rights. A class ac-
tion, however, may be essential to enforce federal rights. Judge Wisdom explained in Wyatt
v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974), a case concerning the care of mental patients in a
state institution, that:
[T]here are special reasons why reliance upon individual suits by mental patients
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ligated to use busing as a remedy if no other remedy is effective, even
if the court had never ordered busing as a remedy in the past. Any
state policy of judicial restraint against granting that remedy must
yield to the paramount federal policy that federal violations be effec-
tively remedied. Moreover, state legislative action specifically re-
stricting the jurisdiction of the state courts to disallow the remedy of
busing would unconstitutionally discriminate against the federal
remedy.
C. Oblzgation of States to Provide A Particular Federal Remedy in the
Absence of State Statutorg or Constitutional Provisions Giving
Power to Grant the Remedy
A state court may lack state statutory or constitutional power to
grant a specific federal remedy or even to grant an effective remedy
for a federal claim. The state court must, of course, grant the appro-
priate federal remedy to the extent that it grants analogous relief
under state law. For example, assume federal statutory law required
that widespread violations of patients' rights at mental institutions be
remedied by the appointment of a special master to oversee the im-
plementation of corrective measures. A state court which had no
state statutory or constitutional power to appoint a special master
might contend that the power to appoint a special master falls
outside the arsenal of the state court's equitable remedies. If, how-
ever, the state court has the power to grant a similar remedy, such as
to appoint a receiver to oversee property, the state court should be
obligated to appoint a special master (assuming the receiver's respon-
sibilities under state law were comparable to those of a special
master). Under Testa, a state court is obligated to provide the federal
remedy even if no state remedy is precisely analogous.
There is a limit, however, to what state remedies can be viewed
as analogous to the federal remedy required. Analysis here mirrors
the previous discussion concerning the exercise of jurisdiction. The
possibility that Congress can restrict the jurisdiction of the inferior
would be especially inappropriate. Mental patients are particularly unlikely to be
aware of their legal rights. They are likely to have especially limited access to legal
assistance. Individual suits may be protracted and expensive, and individual
mental patients may therefore be deterred from bringing them.
Id. at 1316. Class actions are more than a form of procedure. They may be a necessary part
of an effective remedy. If class actions are necessary to vindicate federal rights, and if a state
court has the power to provide class relief, any state policy not to provide this relief (such as
the policy of New York not to permit class actions against state and local government, see, e.g.,
Jones v. Berman, 37 N.Y.2d 42, 333 N.E.2d 303, 371 N.Y.S.2d 422 (1975)), must succumb to
the federal policy that an effective remedy be provided.
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federal courts or eliminate them entirely argues not only that states
must create courts that can hear all federal claims, but also that those
courts must have the power to give the precise remedy required by
federal law. It is not necessary, however, to reach this ultimate issue.
As long as federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction, state courts
which have no analogous power under the state constitution or stat-
utes generally need not enforce the precise remedy required by fed-
eral law. 68 If, however, Congress were to restrict inferior federal
court jurisdiction so that federal claims had to be brought in state
court, then state courts would have to provide the exact remedy re-
quired by federal law. 169
In any event, even without restriction of access to the federal
courts, the requirement of Crain that state courts hear all federal con-
stitutional claims concerning acts of state officials, and perhaps all
claims that state action violates federal law, strongly suggests that
state courts must also grant the requisite effective federal remedies,
whether or not they have existing remedial power to do so. Protect-
ing federal rights requires not only that state courts assume jurisdic-
tion, but also that they provide effective remedies.
Conclusion
It may seem ironic that the magnitude of a social ill should ever
serve as an excuse for courts to refuse to intervene to correct injustices
created by failures in the administration of government institu-
tions. 70 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court in Pennhurst cited the wide-
spread, grievous wrongs inflicted on state mental patients in support
168 Perhaps the demands of the supremacy clause need not intrude so greatly on the state
courts because a federal forum exists to provide the appropriate effective remedies. Of course,
this conclusion would be contrary to the "possibility of extremes" analysis of Crabz discussed
in text accompanying note 113 supra.
169 See Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478 n.4 (1981); see also Katz,
The Jurisprudence of Remedies: Constitutional Legality and the Law of Torts in Bell v. Hood, 117 U.
PA. L. REv. 1, 54 (1968).
If Congress were to withdraw jurisdiction from the federal courts over certain causes of
action or certain remedies, it might seek to do the same with state courts. Were it to attempt
this, Congress would clearly have the power to withdraw jurisdiction from state courts over
federal statutory claims and remedies, but not over federal constitutional claims, because the
state courts have an independent duty to enforce the Constitution. See note 93 supra.
170 The magnitude of a social ill, one might argue, is the very reason why the doctrine of
the separation of powers gives the legislature and the executive, not the judiciary, the primary
responsibility, with great discretion, to carry out policy in the administration of social pro-
grams. But, when the legislative and executive branches do not provide the very services they
are obligated to provide to institutionalized individuals, it is appropriate for the courts to
correct a failed political process. See United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-
53 n.4 (1938).
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of its argument that the Constitution bars federal judicial interven-
tion on state grounds against state officials.171 State courts may simi-
larly be reluctant to intrude on state executive and legislative
functions, as some have been in the past, even when plaintiffs present
compelling arguments grounded in state and federal law. Referring
plaintiffs back to the political process which failed to provide the ap-
propriate care and the necessary facilities does not solve the problem.
State courts, then, are faced with a choice: they can vindicate rights
in a way which may require them to assume an unaccustomed role,
or they can ignore the pleas of plaintiffs, thus effectively rendering
state law rights a nullity.
As a matter of state law, these issues must be addressed sepa-
rately in each of the fifty judicial systems; as a matter of federal law,
however, the supremacy clause obligates the state courts to use their
full powers to enforce federal claims and to grant precise, effective
remedies, even when to do so is to override state policies against in-
tervention, and even when the state courts would not have heard
similar state claims under state justiciability standards. State courts
are indeed, especially after Pennhurst, the primary protectors of indi-
vidual rights against violations of those rights by state officials.
171 Pennhurst, 104 S. Ct. at 912 n.16 (arguing that responsibility for the plight of mental
patients is on the state itself, not on the individual and institutional defendants, and thus the
failure of these defendants to provide proper treatment for these mental patients cannot be
characterized as ultra vires).
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